That a man is free to abandon the benefits and throw off the burdens of citizenship, may indeed be inferred from the admissions of existing authorities and of current opinion.
Unprepared as they probably are for so extreme a doctrine as the one here maintained, the radicals of our day yet unwittingly profess their belief in a maxim which obviously embodies this doctrine.
Do we not continually hear them quote Blackstones assertion that no subject of England can be constrained to pay any aids or taxes even for the defence of the realm or the support of government, but such as are imposed by his own consent, or that of his representative in parliament?
And what does this mean?
It means, say they, that every man should have a vote.
True: but it means much more.
If there is any sense in words it is a distinct enunciation of the very right now contended for.
In affirming that a man may not be taxed unless he has directly or indirectly given his consent, it affirms that he may refuse to be so taxed; and to refuse to be taxed, is to cut all connection with the state.
Perhaps it will be said that this consent is not a specific, but a general one, and that the citizen is understood to have assented to everything his representative may do, when he voted for him.
But suppose he did not vote for him; and on the contrary did all in his power to get elected some one holding opposite views what then?
The reply will probably be that, by taking part in such an election, he tacitly agreed to abide by the decision of the majority.
And how if he did not vote at all?
Why then he cannot justly complain of any tax, seeing that he made no protest against its imposition.
So, curiously enough, it seems that he gave his consent in whatever way he acted whether he said yes, whether he said no, or whether he remained neuter!
A rather awkward doctrine this.
Here stands an unfortunate citizen who is asked if he will pay money for a certain proffered advantage; and whether he employs the only means of expressing his refusal or does not employ it, we are told that he practically agrees; if only the number of others who agree is greater than the number of those who dissent.
And thus we are introduced to the novel principle that As consent to a thing is not determined by what A says, but by what B may happen to say!
It is for those who quote Blackstone to choose between this absurdity and the doctrine above set forth.
Either his maxim implies the right to ignore the state, or it is sheer nonsense.
From The Right to Ignore the State, in Social Statics