10.16.06
Politics Against Politics
[cross-posted at Liberty & Power]
I’ve argued, some would say ad nauseam, that the libertarian struggle against statist oppression needs to be integrated (or re-integrated) with traditionally left-wing struggles against various sorts of non-state oppression such as patriarchy, racism, bossism, etc.
My position finds support, albeit in a less than straightforward way, in Rothbard’s article “Contempt for the Usual” in the May 1971 issue of Libertarian Forum.
This might seem an odd article for me to cite on behalf of my leftist heresy, since the article is a sustained attack on cultural leftism generally and feminism in particular. But I maintain that Rothbard’s arguments, no doubt malgré lui, actually support my position.
Here are some crucial excerpts:
For apart from the tendency on the Left to employ coercion, the Left seems to be constitutionally incapable of leaving people alone in the most fundamental sense; it seems incapable of refraining from a continual pestering, haranguing and harassment of everyone in sight or earshot. … The Left is incapable of recognizing the legitimacy of the average person’s peaceful pursuit of his own goals and his own values in his quietly sensible life.
Many libertarians who are enamoured of the principles of Maoism point out that, in theory at least, the decentralized communes and eternal self-and-mutual-criticism sessions are supposed to be voluntary and not imposed by violence. Even granting this point, Maoism at its best, forswearing violence, would be well-nigh intolerable to most of us, and certainly to anyone wishing to pursue a truly individualist life. For Maoism depends on a continual badgering, harassing, and pestering of every person in one’s purview to bring him into the full scale of values, attitudes, and convictions held by the rest of his neighbors. … The point is that in the Maoist world, even at its most civilized, the propaganda barrage is everywhere.
To put it another way: one crucial and permanent difference between libertarians and the Left is in their vision of a future society. Libertarians want the end of politics; they wish to abolish politics forever, so that each individual may live his life unmolested and as he sees fit. But the Left, in contrast, wants to politicize everything; for the Left, every individual action, no matter how trivial or picayune, becomes a “political” act, to be examined, criticized, denounced, and rehabilitated in accordance with the Left’s standards. … The Women’s Lib movement, of course, has been in the forefront of this elevating of hectoring and pestering into a universal moral obligation. …
One would hope that the free society of the future would be free, not only of aggressive violence, but also of self-righteous and arrogant nagging and harassment. “Mind your own business” implies that each person attend well to his own affairs, and allow every other man the same privilege. It is a morality of basic civility, of courtesy, of civilized life, of respect for the dignity of every individual. It does not encompass all of morality, but by God it is a necessary ingredient to a truly rational and civilized social ethic. …
The crucial point here is that those libertarians whose only philosophy is to oppose coercive violence are missing a great deal of the essence of the ideological struggles of our time. The trouble with the Left is not simply its propensity for coercion; it is also, and in some sense more fundamentally, its hatred of excellence and individuality, its hostility to the division of labor, its itch for total uniformity, and its dedication to the Universal and Permanent Pester. And as it looks around the world, it finds that the main object of its hatred is the Middle American, the man who quietly holds all of the values which it cannot tolerate. … [O]ne of the great and unfilled tasks of the rationalist intellectual, the true intellectual if you will, is to come to the aid of the bourgeoisie, to rescue the Middle American from his triumphant tormentors. … In the name of truth and reason, we must rise up as the shield and the hammer of the average American.
So how does all this support my position? Well, notice that Rothbard here treats the principle of minding one’s own business as broader than the non-aggression principle; he criticises “those libertarians whose only philosophy is to oppose coercive violence” for not recognising that minding one’s own business implies a rejection “not only of aggressive violence, but also of self-righteous and arrogant nagging and harassment,” even when such nagging and harassment involve no use of force against person or property.
In short, then, Rothbard in effect agrees that a pervasive attitude of such “intolerable” Maoist-style criticism, even if peaceful, would be a form of oppression, and one that libertarians should be concerned to combat just as much as they combat actual aggression. And this is exactly the sort of thing I’ve been saying too. Restrictive cultural attitudes and practices can be oppressive even if nonviolent, and should be combated (albeit, of course, nonviolently) by libertarians for some of the same sorts of reasons that violent oppression should be combated.
Of course, Rothbard’s point might seem to support mine only generically, not specifically – since he identifies feminism, rather than patriarchy, as an instance of the form of oppression he’s concerned to combat. As Rothbard sees it, “the Middle American, the man who quietly holds all of the values which [the Left] cannot tolerate,” is inoffensively minding his own business, while feminists and other leftists who attack his values are refusing to mind their own business, and are instead subjecting the ordinary mainstream American to “a continual badgering, harassing, and pestering … to bring him into the full scale of values, attitudes, and convictions held by the rest of his neighbors.”
I think this is the wrong way to understand the nature of the complaints that feminists and other leftists are bringing. That’s not to say, of course, that we feminists et al. are never guilty of the sort of thing Rothbard is referring to; any ideology can be, and every ideology surely has been, defended in obnoxious, officious, and intrusive ways, and feminism is no exception. But the question is whether that’s the whole story, or even the main story, with the feminist criticisms that Rothbard is talking about, and I claim it isn’t. The way to understand the criticisms that we feminists bring is to see that from our point of view it is patriarchy that refuses to leave people alone – that the process by which patriarchal attitudes are promoted, inculcated, and reinforced amounts precisely to “a continual badgering, harassing, and pestering of every person [especially women] in one’s purview to bring [her] into the full scale of [patriarchal] values, attitudes, and convictions held by the rest of [her] neighbors.”
The point of feminist criticism is thus not to politicise the reproduction of male supremacy but rather to identify the political character it already possesses, and the aim of a feminist political movement (understanding “political” here to denote any organised movement for social change, whether peaceful or violent) is to defend women against such oppression, to serve as their “shield and hammer.” And ditto, mutatis mutandis, for the defence of workers, gays, ethnic minorities, etc., against various forms of oppression which, while indeed often supported by violent means (statist or otherwise), are by no means confined to such means. To whatever extent Rothbard’s “Middle Americans” are complicit in such oppression, they are to that extent not minding their own business – and leftist attempts to correct their attitudes are then strictly defensive, in service rather than violation of “a morality of basic civility, of courtesy, of civilized life, of respect for the dignity of every individual.”
Tim said,
October 16, 2006 at 7:16 pm
If a libertarian collects stamps does that make stamp collecting a libertarian issue? If a Middle American is a sexist, racist, homophobic, tree hating nice person but engages with his fellow hominids on a voluntary contractual basis, Rothbard is right.
Administrator said,
October 16, 2006 at 11:45 pm
If a libertarian collects stamps does that make stamp collecting a libertarian issue?
No. But what does that have to do with anything I said?
If a Middle American is a sexist, racist, homophobic, tree hating nice person but engages with his fellow hominids on a voluntary contractual basis, Rothbard is right.
Right about what? The passage I cited shows that Rothbard thinks a) that libertarians should oppose nonviolent as well as violent forms of oppression, and b) that feminism is one of those nonviolent forms of oppression. I agreed with Rothbard about (a) but disagreed with him about (b). So which claim of Rothbard are you supporting? (a)? (b)? Something else?
Tim said,
October 17, 2006 at 2:12 am
Libertarians only need agree on non-aggression principle. On issues like feminism or stamp collecting or wilderness conservation, to each his own. I agree with Rothbard and you on (a) as for (b) you are both half right but backing different halfs. Feminism and “Middle Americanism” include a mix of voluntary and coercive measures. My guess is both you and Rothbard would agree about that, the difference is the comparative evaluation as to proportions within each.
Albert Esplugas said,
October 17, 2006 at 8:41 am
Roderick, I copy here the comment I’ve posted in hnn’s blog:
I don’t see why patriarchy, bossism or even racism is necessarily unlibertarian. And if it’s not, then I don’t see why we should, qua libertarians, oppose those things. Sure I oppose these attitudes / values, but if they are not, per se, incompatible with libertarianism, I can’t oppose them qua libertarian. It is conceivable a libertarian with patriarchal values, how you reconcile that with your position? He too is a libertarian, why as a libertarian has to abandon or fight against these values that are his own? Libertarians are against agression, not against “opression” (again, qua libertarians). A libertarian may support or have attitudes that you consider “opressive” and still be a principled libertarian. I think that your reasoning on this matter is confusing and flawed. You don’t need to appeal to libertarianism to oppose those things, you have to appel to human decency, common sense, moral virtue or something else. May be some of these attitudes / values usually lead to statits positions, but that, again, it’s not necessarily true, and to the extend that it is as libertarians we can fight these attitudes but always having in mind that it’s not “oppression” what we are fighting but agression. Qua libertarians (not as moral agents) the fight against these attituted can only be instrumental.
Administrator said,
October 17, 2006 at 9:58 am
Tim: Libertarians only need agree on non-aggression principle.
That’s an incomplete sentence. Only need agree on the non-aggression principle — in order to what? In order to count as libertarians? Fine, I agree. In order to be consistent in recognising and applying the implications of libertarianism? There I disagree.
I agree with Rothbard and you on (a)
But that seems inconsistent with what you just said. For what (a) says is that libertarians need to embrace a mind-your-own-business principle that’s broader than the non-aggression principle. So how can you agree with me and Rothbard on (a) when you’ve just said that “libertarians only need agree on non-aggression principle,” which is inconsistent with (a)?
as for (b) you are both half right but backing different halfs. Feminism and “Middle Americanism” include a mix of voluntary and coercive measures.
It sounds to me like you’re misunderstanding Rothbard’s point. Rothard’s objection to feminism, in that article, is not that it embraces coercive measures. What he says is that feminism would be oppressive, and worthy to be combated by libertarians, even if it were completely noncoercive.
Albert Esplugas: It is conceivable a libertarian with patriarchal values, how you reconcile that with your position? He too is a libertarian, why as a libertarian has to abandon or fight against these values that are his own? Libertarians are against agression, not against “oppression” (again, qua libertarians).
Once again, my claim is not that a libertarian with patriarchal values doesn’t count as a libertarian. Of course he (or she) does. But I do claim that such a libertarian hasn’t fully grasped the implications of libertarian values.
Charles Johnson, in this piece, distinguishes five different “levels on which you might claim that libertarianism ought to go along with some thicker bundle of social and cultural commitments, practices, or projects.” Let me quote the three main ones:
Charles Johnson: There might be cases in which the bundle could be rejected without a formal contradiction to the non-aggression principle, but not without in fact interfering with its application. There are cases in which people disagree over the line where my rights end and yours begin; and libertarians might argue that some thick bundles need to be preferred over others in order to avoid conceptual blinders against certain rights or forms of aggression. Think of the feminist criticism of the traditional division between the “private” and the “political” sphere and those who draw it in such a way that systematic violence and coercion within “families” are justified, or excused, or ignored, as something “private” and therefore less than a serious form of violent oppression. Or the way in which garden-variety collectivism prevents many non-libertarians from even recognizing taxation or legislation by a democratic government as a form of coercion in the first place. Here the bundle of commitments that libertarians need to have isn’t just a special application of libertarian principle; the argument calls in resources other than the non-aggression principle to determine just where and how the principle is properly applied. In that sense the thickness called for is thicker than entailment thickness; but the cash value of the “thick” commitments is still the direct contribution they make towards the full and complete application of the non-aggression principle. Call this “application thickness.”
There might be cases in which a bundle is neither strictly entailed by the non-aggression principle, nor necessary for its correct application, but may be a causal precondition for implementing the non-aggression principle in the real world. Thick libertarians might suggest cases in which it’s difficult or even impossible for a free society to emerge, or survive over the long term, or flourish, without the right bundle of commitments, because the wrong bundle (say, blind obedience to traditional authority), without logically conflicting with libertarianism, might still make it very hard for libertarian ideas to get much purchase in our actual society, or for a future free society to resist a collapse into statism or civil war. Since this offers instrumental grounds for, say, individualist self-reliance to be bundled along with libertarianism, call this “instrumental thickness.” [Note: more recently Charles calls this “strategic thickness.”]
Some bundles might be consistent with the non-aggression principle, but might undermine or contradict the deeper reasons that justify libertarian principles in the first place. Here it would be claimed that the you could accept libertarianism without the thicker bundle consistently, but that you couldn’t do so reasonably, because rejecting the bundle means rejecting the grounds for your libertarianism. Call this “grounds thickness.”
So when I claim that libertarians qua libertarians need to oppose patriarchy and other nonviolent (or at least not-necessarily-violent) forms of oppression, what I’m claiming is that libertarianism is tied to feminism, and to cultural leftism more broadly, by application thickness, instrumental/strategic thickness, and grounds thickness. (And for some reasons why feminism in particular might count as one of the values thickly bound with libertarianism, see our piece on libertarian feminism.)
Albert Esplugas said,
October 17, 2006 at 11:47 am
Roderick, I think that your (and Charles Johnson’s) point coincides –partially- with my contention: “May be some of these attitudes / values usually lead to statits positions, but that, again, it’s not necessarily true, and to the extend that it is as libertarians we can fight these attitudes but always having in mind that it’s not “oppression” what we are fighting but agression. Qua libertarians (not as moral agents) the fight against these attituted can only be instrumental.” But in your insistence to fight against “oppression” qua libertarians I don’t perceive –at least not in every case, this time for exemple- a recognizition of its instrumental nature. Rather, it seems that libertarianism imply opposing and challenging oppression, that we should confront it because it is objectively evil, injust per se, and I don’t buy it. What you call oppresive attitudes or values may be others (libertarians included) consider proper or defensible values. We are not talking about rights now, but moral values. Whatever your moral values, I think you can –at least theoretically- fully grasp libertarianism and its implications. Rights are objective, moral values are subjective. You can justify objective rights (and adhere consistently to them) whatever your subjetive values (provided your values don’t champion agression), since objective rights are not grounded in your subjective values but in the nature both of human beings and the world in wich they live. Thus, I think that challenging “oppression” is not a libertarian task except to the extent that “oppression” fuels statists positions. Libertarians can oppose “oppression” for the same reason they favor political decentralization: because it may contribute to the expansion of liberty. A decentralized political organization is also illegitimate, but it is preferable because its incentive structure can promote more freedom. Likewise, patriarchal, racist… values are legitimate, as any other attitude or value, but because they usually lead to statist positions they must be confronted by libertarians. Do you agree with that analogy?
quasibill said,
October 17, 2006 at 12:41 pm
To me, libertarianism, if anything, is simply the recognition that a peaceful life - for everyone - is the goal. To that end, the non-agression principle is the fundamental norm that should never be abrogated. Past that, there seems to be many different internally coherent “cultural” variants on the NAP. Each of which will be fine internally. The question becomes what happens when these “cultural” variants run into each other? Return to fundamentals - the NAP. Live and let live. The more you attack the cultural assumptions underlying a specific form of “thick” libertarianism, the more you’ll do two things - 1) undermine a possibly important pillar for that form of libertarianism, thereby opening the door for the rise of statist thinking, and 2) create a “threat” to a way of living, which will create popular support for a state based solution. It’s one of those “unintended consequences” scenarios.
I’ll go so far as to say that I’m very sympathetic to Roderick and Rad Geek’s version of thick libertarianism - given the choice between theirs and say a Gary North (not basing this on anything more than his clearly Christian outlook, so I mean no offense to Gary, whose writing I respect greatly) style thick libertarianism, I’ll choose the former, thank you. But I think both are viable and legitimate forms, that should never see each other as an “enemy”. I’d far prefer living in Gary North’s thick lib community to pretty much any other option out there. The differences in thick libertarian thought should be considered market choices, even if they appear irrational, so long as the NAP isn’t violated.
If you’re constantly looking for a fight over culture, you’ll never achieve the ultimate goal, as I see it, which is a peaceful life for everyone.
Administrator said,
October 17, 2006 at 2:20 pm
Albert Esplugas: Roderick, I think that your (and Charles Johnson’s) point coincides – partially — with my contention: “May be some of these attitudes / values usually lead to statits positions, but that, again, it’s not necessarily true, and to the extend that it is as libertarians we can fight these attitudes but always having in mind that it’s not “oppression” what we are fighting but agression. Qua libertarians (not as moral agents) the fight against these attituted can only be instrumental.” But in your insistence to fight against “oppression” qua libertarians I don’t perceive– at least not in every case, this time for exemple- a recognizition of its instrumental nature.
So, if I understand you correctly, you’re saying that you accept instrumental/strategic thickness, but you think it applies less broadly than I do. Okay, but then what about grounds thickness and application thickness? Do you accept or reject those?
What you call oppresive attitudes or values may be others (libertarians included) consider proper or defensible values. We are not talking about rights now, but moral values.
Well, yes, libertarians can, and obviously do, disagree about which values are oppressive. Of course libertarians also can and do disagree about which actions are rights-violating. Thus libertarians disagree about abortion, intellectual property, and so on. But in both cases, the question is: which position is correct?
Whatever your moral values, I think you can — at least theoretically — fully grasp libertarianism and its implications.
Okay, that I deny — since I think the various thicknesses are among the relevant “implications.”
Rights are objective, moral values are subjective. You can justify objective rights (and adhere consistently to them) whatever your subjetive values (provided your values don’t champion agression), since objective rights are not grounded in your subjective values but in the nature both of human beings and the world in wich they live.
Aha! This, I think, is the heart of our disagreement. You think one part of morality — namely justice (i.e., respect for rights) is objective, and that all the rest of morality is subjective! But why should anybody believe that?
By contrast I think all of morality is objective — that morality as a whole is “not grounded in your subjective values but in the nature both of human beings and the world in which they live.” Indeed, I don’t think it’s possible to justify a theory of rights in isolation from a broader set of values. So my question to you is: why do you draw this bifurcation in the moral realm, making justice objective and all the rest of morality subjective?
quasibill: Return to fundamentals - the NAP. Live and let live.
But the point of my original post was that “live and let live” is broader than just the NAP.
Let me add, though, that I don’t claim that libertarianism requires just one specific set of cultural values. I’m a generic universalist but a specific pluralist.
The more you attack the cultural assumptions underlying a specific form of “thick” libertarianism, the more you’ll do two things - 1) undermine a possibly important pillar for that form of libertarianism, thereby opening the door for the rise of statist thinking, and 2) create a “threat” to a way of living, which will create popular support for a state based solution. It’s one of those “unintended consequences” scenarios.
But notice that this argument you just gave is not a support for thin libertarianism. You’re actually defending a form of thick libertarianism. You’re saying that libertarianism is bound, via instrumental/strategic thickness, to a value not directly entailed by the NAP, namely the value of not criticising other thick libertarianisms. And so it seems to me that your argument self-destructs. Because if it works against my position, it works just as well against itself. That is, according to your own criticism itself, by criticising my version of thick libertarianism you’re 1) undermining a possibly important pillar for that form of libertarianism, thereby opening the door for the rise of statist thinking, and 2) creating a “threat” to a way of living, which will create popular support for a state based solution ….
If you’re constantly looking for a fight over culture, you’ll never achieve the ultimate goal, as I see it, which is a peaceful life for everyone.
But you can define peace narrowly, meaning non-aggression only, or you can define it broadly, meaning non-aggression plus the absence of nonviolent oppression. I think Rothbard’s article makes a persuasive case for defining it broadly (even though he and I obviously disagree vastly about the details).
quasibill said,
October 17, 2006 at 3:14 pm
ah, but I’m not truly criticizing your version of thick libertarianism. I’m merely stating that you shouldn’t attack other versions or advocate against them. You can claim you are right, and in fact, argue in debates that you are right, but that’s about as far as it should ever go. Any other effort at creating the cultural changes you want in a different system can, and most likely will, have unintended consequences which may get the state’s foot in the door.
Unless I’m wrong, I don’t see your version of thick libertarianism as requiring a world cultural revolution to create the perfect libertarian man. “Panarchy”, as I’ve see you advocate, would allow you to have your form of thickness, while also allowing North style thickness to develop peacefully in its own area. To me, there are objective limits to justice, but there is a fairly large space between those limits where there can be many subjective valuations involved. However, I agree that you need a broader set of values to define justice - I only disagree that there is one set of objectively right broad values. There are several, if not many, that are internally coherent and therefore internally legitimate. Hence, Panarchy is the only defensible solution.
Albert Esplugas said,
October 17, 2006 at 3:53 pm
By contrast I think all of morality is objective — that morality as a whole is “not grounded in your subjective values but in the nature both of human beings and the world in which they live.” Indeed, I don’t think it’s possible to justify a theory of rights in isolation from a broader set of values. So my question to you is: why do you draw this bifurcation in the moral realm, making justice objective and all the rest of morality subjective?
Do you think that all moral values are objetive? For or against altruism, for or against love, for or against honesty or integrity, for or against promiscuity, for or against fidelity, for or against family, for or against using force to seek restitution, for or against caring for animals, for or against caring for ecology etc etc. Do you think there is an objective response for every one of these moral issues? I think not, and I really doubt you think otherwise. May be we are talking about different things.
I am no expert, but I tend to think that justice is objective because, in a sense, it doesn’t take part on behalf of one’s particular values but permit the pursuing of every one’s subjetive values / ends avoiding violent conflict between them. Elaboreting on this, given the nature of human beings and the world in wich we live, rights are necessary for every one to pursue his subjetive ends and live according to its values without conflicting with each other. I think I am not grounding rights in subjective values, unless favor that every one can pursue his subjetive ends peacefully is a moral value by itself. If it is, then may be I’m guilty of favoring only that broad moral value qua libertarian, but I don’t see why endorsing it would mean that I have to endorse that all morality or moral values are objective. Neither I see why to justify libertarianism consistently on terms of rights one has to opposse what you call oppression (racism, bossism, patriarchy).
Albert Esplugas said,
October 17, 2006 at 4:06 pm
For what (a) says is that libertarians need to embrace a mind-your-own-business principle that’s broader than the non-aggression principle.
Let me add another question: If a racist person discriminates against blacks (as consumers or laborers) in his own business, do you think he is not minding his own business? If a man marries four women and they consent happily (and also consent to do domestic work etc.) do you think he is not minding his own business because he is exhibiting a patriarchal attitude?
Anonymous2 said,
October 17, 2006 at 6:27 pm
If a racist person discriminates against blacks (as consumers or laborers) in his own business, do you think he is not minding his own business? If a man marries four women and they consent happily (and also consent to do domestic work etc.) do you think he is not minding his own business because he is exhibiting a patriarchal attitude?
I believe Long has stated before he only considers those to be “oppression” if a lot of people in a given area do them. In other words, if an employer discriminates against blacks and he is the only one doing it, no problem. But if it’s a cultural-wide practice to discriminate against the “inferior” blacks, then you start to have application- and instrumental-thickness problems, and then it becomes a duty to combat it.
Administrator said,
October 17, 2006 at 6:51 pm
quasibill: I’m merely stating that you shouldn’t attack other versions or advocate against them. You can claim you are right, and in fact, argue in debates that you are right, but that’s about as far as it should ever go.
a) But what if “attacking other versions and advocating against them” is part of my version of thick libertarianism?
b) What exactly is the line between “attacking other versions and advocating against them” (which you’re against) and “claiming you are right, and in fact, arguing in debates that you are right” (which you’re not against) — assuming neither involves coercion? What does the former involve that the latter doesn’t?
Albert Esplugas: Do you think that all moral values are objetive? For or against altruism, for or against love, for or against honesty or integrity, for or against promiscuity, for or against fidelity, for or against family, for or against using force to seek restitution, for or against caring for animals, for or against caring for ecology etc etc. Do you think there is an objective response for every one of these moral issues?
Yes, of course I think all those issues are objective. Your tone above is incredulous, but suppose someone said to you: do you really think all rights are objective? For or against taxation, for or against gun control, for or against securities and exchange laws, for or against zoning laws, for or against drug laws …. Presumably you’d say that of course all those are objective. So what’s the difference?
Elaboreting on this, given the nature of human beings and the world in wich we live, rights are necessary for every one to pursue his subjetive ends and live according to its values without conflicting with each other.
But why is that an objective value? Suppose someone says: “I like conflict.” How can you say anything against him, if you don’t believe in objective morality?
Neither I see why to justify libertarianism consistently on terms of rights one has to opposse what you call oppression (racism, bossism, patriarchy).
Because it would be very odd if it were a horrible horrible thing for people to be pushed around and have their lives stunted if it’s done in one way, but perfectly okay and dandy for people to be pushed around and have their lives stunted if it’s done in some other way. If people don’t matter enough for us to oppose their being oppressed, why should they matter enough for us to oppose their being aggressed against?
If a racist person discriminates against blacks (as consumers or laborers) in his own business, do you think he is not minding his own business?
What Anonympus2 said, more or less. See this piece by Marilyn Frye.
Administrator said,
October 17, 2006 at 6:56 pm
And here’s the especially relevant passage from the Frye piece:
Consider a birdcage. If you look very closely at just one wire in the cage, you cannot see the other wires. If your conception of what is before you is determined by this myopic focus, you could look at that one wire, up and down the length of it, and be unable to see why a bird would not just fly around the wire any time it wanted to go somewhere. Furthermore, even if, one day at a time, you myopically inspected each wire, you still could not see why a bird would gave trouble going past the wires to get anywhere. There is no physical property of any one wire, nothing that the closest scrutiny could discover, that will reveal how a bird could be inhibited or harmed by it except in the most accidental way. It is only when you step back, stop looking at the wires one by one, microscopically, and take a macroscopic view of the whole cage, that you can see why the bird does not go anywhere; and then you will see it in a moment. It will require no great subtlety of mental powers. It is perfectly obvious that the bird is surrounded by a network of systematically related barriers, no one of which would be the least hindrance to its flight, but which, by their relations to each other, are as confining as the solid walls of a dungeon.
It is now possible to grasp one of the reasons why oppression can be hard to see and recognize: one can study the elements of an oppressive structure with great care and some good will without seeing the structure as a whole, and hence without seeing or being able to understand that one is looking at a cage and that there are people there who are caged, whose motion and mobility are restricted, whose lives are shaped and reduced.
Tim said,
October 17, 2006 at 8:01 pm
I can see Rod’s point about me misreading Rothbard, he wasn’t after all just a libertarian (in other words a normal human being).
This idea of non-coercive oppression seems to me to be risky. The idea of ‘non-coercive oppression’ against minorities, women, gays etc. seems to be what people have in mind, but couldn’t the same argument be deployed to argue that higher prices paid by people in remote areas were a form of non-coercive oppression?
After all here is a small group of people treated differently who may argue that the reduced economic opportunities they face is ‘unfair’. In fact they do, see the demand for state subsidised rural electrification and now a push for similar underwriting of broadband internet access. The issue however goes beyond those high profile items.
The counter would be ‘higher transport costs etc.’, but a race discriminating or gender discriminating employer could make the same argument i.e. employing minority x members in my shop imposes an additional cost to me. The cost may be in making other workers unhappy or losing customers or just personal discomfort. Of course someone in a remote location could escape his or her non-coercive oppressed status by moving to the city, presumably that’s easier than changing sex. But you could say to aggrieved members of oppressed minority group x, ‘why not move to Minority X Town where there isn’t any non-coercive oppression’?
I am probably being pedantic above, but in practical political terms, it is still sensible for libertarians to have something to say to feminists, gays, minorities etc beyond the free market and individual rights. I suppose this is best met by historical analyses of how state measures may have aggravated the oppressed condition. Not just overt stuff (ie apartheid) but administrative / operational stuff. For example discriminatory law enforcement.There is some empirical economic stuff that indicates that the more competitive the market the less likely employers are to bring non-functional issues (race etc) into a hiring decision. Free marketeers would note how government is the main source of monopoly and hence de facto subsidising this practice, which brings us back full circle I suppose to Rod’s point about “identifying”.
Of course, my hypothetical argument is an indirect roundabout one that probably wouldn’t satisy anyone. Call it “trickle down anti-discrimination”. I’d argue a competitive marketplace is an anti-discrimination system that works 24 x 7, doesn’t work to civil service rules and is not subject to politician’s budgeteering, ….but I don’t think that would satisfy the aggrieved either.
So being unsatisfied with the roundabout nature of the free market argument for competitive antidiscrimination, my aggrieved friends will probably start agitating for direct action, ie for state intervention or personal or group intimidation (if arguably only counter-intimidation), which brings us back full circle to Rothbards argument too.
Administrator said,
October 18, 2006 at 12:03 am
Tim: This idea of non-coercive oppression seems to me to be risky. The idea of ‘non-coercive oppression’ against minorities, women, gays etc. seems to be what people have in mind, but couldn’t the same argument be deployed to argue that higher prices paid by people in remote areas were a form of non-coercive oppression?
It’s quite true that if we argue, correctly, that W is a form of (non-rights-violating) oppression, someone else may respond by claiming, mistakenly, that X is also a form of oppression.
But it’s equally true that if we argue, correctly, that Y is a rights-violation, someone else may respond by claiming, mistakenly, that Z is also a rights-violation.
But no libertarian thinks that my second scenario is a reason to give up speaking of rights-violations. So why think the first scenario is a reason to give up speaking of nonviolent oppression?
Call it “trickle down anti-discrimination”. I’d argue a competitive marketplace is an anti-discrimination system that works 24 x 7, doesn’t work to civil service rules and is not subject to politician’s budgeteering, ….but I don’t think that would satisfy the aggrieved either.
Well, I don’t think they should be entirely satisfied, for reasons I explain here. I would say that, for any given set of cultural attitudes, market competition is likely to produce a lower level of discrimination than any other system. But that doesn’t mean that working to change cultural attitudes, or to organize the oppressed, etc., can’t produce an even lower level. Call it sociocultural entrepreneurship.
It’s a mistake to think the only options are “pass a law” and “let the market take care of it.” That’s not how entrepreneurs think. We are the market.
Anonymous2 said,
October 18, 2006 at 1:51 am
It is perfectly obvious that the bird is surrounded by a network of systematically related barriers, no one of which would be the least hindrance to its flight, but which, by their relations to each other, are as confining as the solid walls of a dungeon.
I still haven’t heard the good Dr. Long explain why landlocking someone goes against his libertarian rights.
Or even better: Let’s suppose that we’re living in a magic floating city and somebody comes along and rapidly constructs a perfectly spherical concrete shell (of radius r=2 mi say) surrounding your floating house in the floating city. If you try to drill through the shell at any particular place, the owner stops you at gunpoint, saying you are violating his concrete barrier. Thus we have a libertarian justification for starving someone to death. QED
Sheldon Richman said,
October 18, 2006 at 5:21 am
Perhaps landlocking someone would violate his rights because the perpetrator has imposed a death sentence on someone who has not himself violated rights.
Albert Esplugas said,
October 18, 2006 at 5:54 am
Yes, of course I think all those issues are objective. Your tone above is incredulous, but suppose someone said to you: do you really think all rights are objective? For or against taxation, for or against gun control, for or against securities and exchange laws, for or against zoning laws, for or against drug laws …. Presumably you’d say that of course all those are objective. So what’s the difference?
The difference, I think, is that rights don’t incorporate the subjetive ends of someone in particular but permit the peacefully realization of all of them. The objectivity of economics is related to its value free nature. Similarly, ethics is in a sense value free too, because says “whatever the subjective values of people, if they want to pursue them they should have rights / follow the NAP”. Ok, what if someone don’t want to pursue them peacefully / respecting the NAP? Well, why argue at all with that person, if he is not willing to respect you? Why take him seriously if he is not demanding, by his very own actions, any reciprocity at all? Anyway, I don’t see why endorsing the end / value that all people can realize his own ends / values implies that I have to endorse that all people’s ends / values are objective. And you don’t solve the question of rights by saying that all morality is objective. You are, may I say it, begging the same question that you are posing to me: how do you prove that my subjective moral aversion to take drugs or to prostitute myself are objectively wrong?
Besides, if all moral values are objective, why tolerate wrong values if you discover they are wrong? I think you are somewhat endangering your own libertarian position, since you are saying that all people’s subjetive ends (or moral values in particular, but I think that all conducts have a moral component) can be categorized wrong or right objectively. Others will say: “well, if I determine objectively that taking drugs is wrong, I don’t see why I have to respect the use of drugs”. On the other hand, if you say “people’s subjective ends are subjectively wrong or right. If someone values taking drugs, I can object and say that it will be harmful to him, that it is a vice or whatever, but as long as it satisfies him it is not wrong for him, and I’m in no better position to assert that his conduct is objectively wrong”. In this second case, the drug user won’t feel threatened by your position. You are not pretending to have “the objective truth”, may be some kind of loosely truth. I don’t know if I’m expressing myself clearly, I have troubles speaking in English.
Because it would be very odd if it were a horrible horrible thing for people to be pushed around and have their lives stunted if it’s done in one way, but perfectly okay and dandy for people to be pushed around and have their lives stunted if it’s done in some other way. If people don’t matter enough for us to oppose their being oppressed, why should they matter enough for us to oppose their being aggressed against?
I think it’s the other way around. By caring too much for the non-agressive values of people qua libertarian you are endangering your own libertarian positions. People with these non-agressive values (but nonetheless oppressive) will feel threatened not by your particular values / personal views but by your very own political philosophy. They will think that a libertarian order will be a menace to their non-agressive conducts, and actually it’s not. You are saying to them “libertarians, qua libertarians, will fight against your personal non-agressive values, but you are welcomed in a libertarian order”. It doesn’t make much sense to me. I think it’s better to fight against these oppresive values simply as moral agents and decent human beigns, not as libertarians. Furthermore, if you as a libertarian promote not only the NAP but also other kind of values, other libertarians with different values will be tempted to promote, qua libertarians, his own values, and the distintion between rights and value will be blurred.
Libertarianism is a political philosophy and it is only concerned about justice / the legitimate use of force. Agreed, libertarianism is not only the NAP in the sense that justifiying it requires to go deeper and reason about the nature of human beings (subjective preferences, human action…) and the world (scarcity…) and to contrast the merits of a peaceful / conflict-free social order with that of a violent / conflict enhancing social order. And I tend to agree that libertarianism can go beyond the NAP in the sense that to implement the NAP may be it’s strategically useful to promote / oppose certain values. But the end of all that, qua libertarians, it’s only the NAP.
Imagine we are in a libertarian society. The NAP reigns. Do you consider libertarians have achieved our objective, or is there something else? Imagine that in this libertarian society all individuals are passionate rothbardians. But some ot them are racists (discriminate in their property against people of other races because of that). And others have patriarchal values. But all of them are libertarians and we live in a libertarian order. Would you say still that qua libertarians we have to fight against the values of that group of “oppressive” libertarians? Why, if libertarianism has been achieved and, since its inhabitants are rothbardians, there is no risk that it will disappear any time soon? In a libertarian order, why we have to appeal to libertarianism to combat some non-agressive values instead of human decency and virtue?
Albert Esplugas said,
October 18, 2006 at 5:57 am
“If a racist person discriminates against blacks (as consumers or laborers) in his own business, do you think he is not minding his own business?” - What Anonympus2 said, more or less. See this piece by Marilyn Frye.
ok Roderick, I see it. But anyway I think that the racist owner of the business or the patriarchal man are minding their own business, and your post suggests that (because of their racism / patriarchal values) they are not.
Anonymous2 said,
October 18, 2006 at 6:51 am
Perhaps landlocking someone would violate his rights because the perpetrator has imposed a death sentence on someone who has not himself violated rights
No, no, that’s the whole point of the example, namely that it shows libertarian rights imply the “right” to starve someone to death. (In his Mises talk Dr. Long cites an example where a lack of rights seems to allow the same conclusion and pronounces communism a failure because of it.) Dr. Long always waves his hand about these “easement” issues, so I want a frank and clear answer: Does libertarianism imply the “right” to wall someone in so they need helicopter lifts to keep from starving, or take away most of the oxygen surrounding someone sitting in the park, wall in somebody’s floating space-station with super-funky subspace mines, etc.
Anonymous2 said,
October 18, 2006 at 7:00 am
Why, if libertarianism has been achieved and, since its inhabitants are rothbardians, there is no risk that it will disappear any time soon
That would be the premise Long doesn’t agree with. If they are libertarians, but they have these oppressive “patriarchal” values then there is a risk it will disappear.
quasibill said,
October 18, 2006 at 7:14 am
Well, I’ve started digging by arguing with a Philosophy professor, so instead of climbing back out, I’ll just dig deeper. That’s rational, right?
Anyway, the difference between attacking and defending is exactly the point. Attacking: “North’s (again, just making a useful strawman here) patriarchial, Biblical culture is evil, oppressive, and must be changed for there to be justice in this world.” Would North be justified in feeling threatened by such a statement?
Defending: “Long and Johnson’s culture allows for the fullest, free-est development of each individual, empowering everyone equally. It is the best, most just culture in the world.” Would North be justified in feeling threatened by this statement?
It’s a fine line, sure, but we draw a lot of fine lines as libertarians. The nice part is that it does derive from the NAP. (Note that I’m not necessarily saying that the “attacking” statement necessarily violates the NAP, just that it comes close enough that, as a matter of strategy, it is not a smart choice).
As for the landlocked example - that illustrates an important point about how common law - a very nearly free market law provision process historically - dealt with very hard cases. It didn’t, until such a controversy was in front of it, and at that point, considered ALL of the circumstances. Justice in such a case would depend on all sorts of other facts, such as technology, prior actions (of all parties), and current community standards of morality.
I think the major point is that it’s unlikely to happen in a free market (the victim is likely to not allow it to happen, and perhaps more likely, very few human beings are so sociopathic as to want to do it to another), but if it does, it’s not a refutation of property rights per se, but rather an acknowledgement that they aren’t an end unto themselves, but rather the best means yet devised to provide for a peaceful life for everyone. In extreme situations, there is nothing wrong with overriding property rights (as there were certainly common law defenses such as necessity to trespass actions).
Matt Jenny said,
October 18, 2006 at 10:13 am
A very interesting discussion about subjects, some of which I haven’t made up my mind about at all.
I’d like to address a minor point though. Anonymous2 says: “I still haven’t heard the good Dr. Long explain why landlocking someone goes against his libertarian rights.”
I think that’s simple. An absolute right in one’s property obviously includes the right to a “normal use” of that property. Now, if someone builds a house on an empty meadow, she only owns the land the house is standing on. But “using” her property (i.e. her house) in a “normal” way requires her to walk over parts of the meadow each day. So, by doing all that she not only obtains an absolute right to her house but also a right to access her house. Now if someone comes and landlocks her, he thus violates her right to access her house. Thus, while our original house owner cannot prevent anyone from building a house next to hers, since she only owns her house, she can prevent someone from building a weird circular house around hers, for example. By doing that, she wouldn’t violate a single libertarian principle.
I think this reasoning can also be applied to the unlikely cases of sudden collective racism within a given area under which one person suffers. This would be, depending on the severity, either oppression or oppression and actual aggression.
Matt Jenny said,
October 18, 2006 at 10:22 am
I’m not sure if I just made a mistake, so please forgive me if this comment is going to appear twice.
A very interesting discussion about subjects, some of which I haven’t made up my mind about at all.
I’d like to address a minor point though. Anonymous2 says: “I still haven’t heard the good Dr. Long explain why landlocking someone goes against his libertarian rights.”
I think that’s simple. An absolute right in one’s property obviously includes the right to a “normal use” of that property. Now, if someone builds a house on an empty meadow, she only owns the land the house is standing on. But “using” her property (i.e. her house) in a “normal” way requires her to walk over parts of the meadow each day. So, by doing all that she not only obtains an absolute right to her house but also a right to access her house. Now if someone comes and landlocks her, he thus violates her right to access her house. Thus, while our original house owner cannot prevent anyone from building a house next to hers, since she only owns her house, she can prevent someone from building a weird circular house around hers, for example. By doing that, she wouldn’t violate a single libertarian principle.
I think this reasoning can also be applied to the unlikely cases of sudden collective racism within a given area under which one person suffers. This would be, depending on the severity, either oppression or oppression and actual aggression.
Rad Geek said,
October 18, 2006 at 1:28 pm
Albert: The difference, I think, is that rights don’t incorporate the subjetive ends of someone in particular but permit the peacefully realization of all of them.
But clearly it does not permit the peaceful realization of any and every end. Some ends include aggression as a consitutive part — e.g. the ends adopted by fascists (who view war as part of a healthy national life) or by the “positive good” faction of slavery apologists in the Southern United States (who viewed the enslavement of “inferior” races by “superior” races as a good in itself). These ends cannot consistently be combined with the nonaggression principle because the end itself is aggressive.
So to be accurate, you’d have to say something more like this: “Rights don’t incorporate the non-aggressive subjective ends of someone in particular, but permit the peaceful realization of all of those that are non-aggressive.” But since “non-aggressive” is just a synonym here for “non-rights-violating,” that is equivalent to saying “Rights … permit the peaceful realization of all the ends that don’t violate rights.” That’s certainly true (analytically true, even), but I don’t see how it proves anything at all about the status of respecting rights vis-a-vis other moral commitments. You could just as easily say that “egoism permits the selfish realization of all the ends that don’t conflict with my own self-interest,” or “Feminism permits the antisexist realization of all the ends that don’t oppress women.” Any given moral commitment is going to rule on the issues that it takes an interest in, and leave the rest of the field open for other commitments to decide.
Albert: I think it’s the other way around. By caring too much for the non-agressive values of people qua libertarian you are endangering your own libertarian positions. People with these non-agressive values (but nonetheless oppressive) will feel threatened not by your particular values / personal views but by your very own political philosophy. They will think that a libertarian order will be a menace to their non-agressive conducts, and actually it’s not. You are saying to them “libertarians, qua libertarians, will fight against your personal non-agressive values, but you are welcomed in a libertarian order”. It doesn’t make much sense to me.
But I don’t want slimy male supremacist types (or racist creeps, or blowhard know-it-all bosses, or whatever) to feel welcomed in a libertarian order. I think they are at best obnoxious deadweight and at worst an active menace to the prospects for liberty. And I think that they should feel threatened by consistent libertarianism: there is good reason to think that a free society would dramatically undermine their ability to go on oppressing and exploiting their victims.
I’m an anarchist, so I do not advocate using force against anyone — even real creeps — who conscientiously abstains from initiating force against others. But there’s no reason why I should have to co-operate with, or evangelize to, or cater to the sensitivies of, or moderate my tone towards, people whose values I find not only morally repugnant, but also specifically a menace to the real-world application or implementation of libertarian principles. I don’t want to be part of a movement that they are part of and I don’t want to live in a community where they feel welcome. (Besides which I think that any movement in which they are happily accepted is unlikely to make any concrete, long-term progress towards freedom.)
Maybe I’m misunderstanding you here, but you seem to be suggesting that it is pragmatically important for libertarians to portray libertarianism as a very big tent, and that failing to welcome anyone who meets the minimal criteria for counting as a libertarian is in some sense a strategic mistake. But I don’t see how this is true. Numbers don’t always determine political victories; political strategy is not just a matter of getting as many people to rally to your standard as you possibly can. If I’m misunderstanding your point, I hope you’ll correct me. If I’m understanding you rightly, it might help if you could explain more specifically you think that alienating (say) nonviolent white supremacists or peaceful patriarchs is harmful to libertarian prospects.
Albert: I think it’s better to fight against these oppresive values simply as moral agents and decent human beigns, not as libertarians. Furthermore, if you as a libertarian promote not only the NAP but also other kind of values, other libertarians with different values will be tempted to promote, qua libertarians, his own values, and the distintion between rights and value will be blurred.
But “I will not tolerate white supremacy, even where nonviolently imposed, and I will actively organize and agitate against it” is a very different claim from “I am going to start shooting people involved in imposing white supremacy, even if they do so nonviolently” are two obviously different claims, which can be clearly distinguished. And if I make the distinction clearly (which, as a libertarian, I take pains to do), then I don’t see how it would my fault if other people then blurred the distinction that I made. Of course any position can be confused or misrepresented, either by people who think that they agree with it or by people who think that they suppose it. But as long as the position can be and has been made clear by the people advocating it, the responsibility for misunderstanding it lies on those who have misunderstood.
Tim: So being unsatisfied with the roundabout nature of the free market argument for competitive antidiscrimination, my aggrieved friends will probably start agitating for direct action, ie for state intervention or personal or group intimidation (if arguably only counter-intimidation), which brings us back full circle to Rothbards argument too.
Just so we’re clear, “direct action” tactics may be either coercive or noncoercive, but they never involve state intervention. Direct action is defined partly by contrast with efforts to make political changes through electioneering or lobbying government officials. The idea here is that the people who want to make the change take actions that directly contribute to bringing it about, instead of trying to influence and enlist the government or other third parties to do it for them.
N.B.: The people who talk a lot about “direct action” today very often endorse coercive forms of direct action (e.g. doing damage to corporations they don’t like by trashing their storefronts). But that’s not because direct action is inherently coercive; it’s because adopting direct action requires you to get out from under certain myths that the mystique of the State promotes (having to do with Law and Order, the necessity of Working Within the System, etc.), and most people who have managed to divorce themselves from those myths aren’t principled libertarians, and have fallen into the opposite error of romanticizing rebellion as such. There are lots of forms of direct action — involving social ostracism, boycotts, pickets, strikes, building counter-institutions, etc. — that have nothing to do with destroying property or assaulting people, and I for one think that libertarians would benefit from spending less time on vain efforts to lobby and evangelize to the established power elite, and more time examining the history of direct action tactics and promoting their future use as a means to liberty.
Administrator said,
October 18, 2006 at 4:49 pm
Albert Esplugas: You are, may I say it, begging the same question that you are posing to me: how do you prove that my subjective moral aversion to take drugs or to prostitute myself are objectively wrong?
The way we prove anything to be right or wrong is through moral philosophy. One of the central methods of moral philosophy is reflective equilibration, about which see my discussion here.
Besides, if all moral values are objective, why tolerate wrong values if you discover they are wrong? I think you are somewhat endangering your own libertarian position, since you are saying that all people’s subjetive ends (or moral values in particular, but I think that all conducts have a moral component) can be categorized wrong or right objectively. Others will say: “well, if I determine objectively that taking drugs is wrong, I don’t see why I have to respect the use of drugs”.
This is a common argument, that there’s some connection between moral skepticism/relativism/subjectivism on the one hand and toleration on the other. For example, Milton Friedman has said it’s a good thing we don’t know what sin is, because if we did we’d have to ban it.
But I think that reasoning is completely wrong. Suppose I say (as I do) that, say, racism and aggression are both objectively wrong. Now if someone says “so if racism is objectively wrong, why can’t we make it illegal?” the answer is that aggression is also objectively wrong. So objective values don’t threaten freedom if freedom is itself one of those objective values.
By contrast, suppose moral values were subjective, so that being for or against racism were merely a subjective preference. Would that tend to make people less likely to ban racism? I don’t see why — not if they think a preference for or against freedom is subjective too. It’s worth remembering that the Nazis were moral relativists; they explicitly claimed that there were different values for different groups, and that was right according to Jewish values was wrong according to Aryan values and so on, without there being any universally valid morality. That didn’t make them tolerant and freedom-loving, though; instead the Nazis said, “peace may be your bag, dude, but conquest is our bag, so hey, we’re going to conquer you.” (not an exact quote)
People with these non-agressive values (but nonetheless oppressive) will feel threatened not by your particular values / personal views but by your very own political philosophy. They will think that a libertarian order will be a menace to their non-agressive conducts, and actually it’s not.
This objection seems to cut at least as much for me as against me, though. For there are plenty of people who have an aversion to libertarianism because they think it’s indifferent to nonviolent oppression. So if we follow your advice to avoid alienating the pro-oppression folks, the result will be that we alienate the anti-oppression folks. Now if I have to choose between alienating the pro-oppression folks and alienating the anti-oppression folks, well, being anti-oppression myself it’s obvious which way I’m going to choose.
Imagine that in this libertarian society all individuals are passionate rothbardians. But some ot them are racists (discriminate in their property against people of other races because of that). And others have patriarchal values. But all of them are libertarians and we live in a libertarian order. Would you say still that qua libertarians we have to fight against the values of that group of “oppressive” libertarians? Why, if libertarianism has been achieved and, since its inhabitants are rothbardians, there is no risk that it will disappear any time soon?
Because of the three kinds of thickness. Strategic thickness: I claim that a racist society is unlikely to stay libertarian, since it lacks the kind of respect for personhood that a libertarian society depends upon. (Thus as Anonymous2 predicts, I’m skeptical of your “no risk that it will disappear” claim.) Application thickness: I claim that a society that’s confused about respectful treatment in that way is likely to make more mistakes in the application of libertarianism even if they don’t abandon the principle. Grounds thickness: even if they don’t abandon the principle and don’t misapply it, I think their position is unreasonable because there’s a conflict between their racism and the best reasons for being a libertarian, so that even if their racism doesn’t actually undermine their libertarianism, it logically ought to.
In a libertarian order, why we have to appeal to libertarianism to combat some non-agressive values instead of human decency and virtue?
Well, of course human decency and virtue are what we’re ultimately appealing to, since libertarianism and antiracism are both specific applications of decency/virtue. But my claim is that these applications are connected to each other. (No surprise, since as an Aristotelean I accept the unity of virtue.)
But anyway I think that the racist owner of the business or the patriarchal man are minding their own business, and your post suggests that (because of their racism / patriarchal values) they are not.
Right, they’re willingly contributing to an oppressive situation, they’re supplying bars to the birdcage — so they’re not minding their own business.
Anonymous2: No, no, that’s the whole point of the example, namely that it shows libertarian rights imply the “right” to starve someone to death. …Dr. Long always waves his hand about these “easement” issues, so I want a frank and clear answer: Does libertarianism imply the “right” to wall someone in so they need helicopter lifts to keep from starving, or take away most of the oxygen surrounding someone sitting in the park, wall in somebody’s floating space-station with super-funky subspace mines, etc.
I don’t see that I’ve “waved my hand” about these issues. I think the position I’ve taken is clear and consistent: No, libertarianism does not imply the right to “wall someone in so they need helicopter lifts to keep from starving, or take away most of the oxygen surrounding someone sitting in the park, wall in somebody’s floating space-station with super-funky subspace mines,” or any other such scenario. And I’ve given my reason as well: my defense of my rights must not inflict harm on others disproportionate to the seriousness of the rights’ infringement. (Incidentally, I think this is a good example of application thickness: having the right attitude toward the value of other people makes one more likely to apply the NAP in such a way as to treat walling someone in as a violation of NAP rather than as an exercise of rights.) Anonymous2 has said previously that s/he prefers a different way of addressing these issues besides proportionality. Fine, but proportionality is my way of addressing them, and it yields the result that Anonymous2 wants, so what’s the problem?
quasibill: Attacking: “North’s (again, just making a useful strawman here) patriarchial, Biblical culture is evil, oppressive, and must be changed for there to be justice in this world.”
I wouldn’t say “justice,” since I think of justice as having to do with rights. If a situation doesn’t involve a rights-violation, it’s not unjust — though it may be cruel, monstrous, etc.
As for being against attacking — what about attacking statism? I mean statist ideology, not statist practice. It’s not a violation of the NAP to advocate state action. So if we shouldn’t attack any non-rights-violating values, should we not attack statist ideology?
One thing I want to resist is this idea many people, libertarian and not, seem to have that any rights-violation is worse than any non-rights-violating. It’s as though people think that the reason for saying that we can use force against A but not against B is that A is worse than B. But it needn’t be. Systematically undermining someone’s self-confidence is worse than stealing a grape. But there are plenty of reasons — both consequentialist and deontological — why the second should be illegal and the first shouldn’t.
Anonymous2 said,
October 18, 2006 at 7:36 pm
Fine, but proportionality is my way of addressing them, and it yields the result that Anonymous2 wants, so what’s the problem?
The basic problem, which perhaps I should have stated before, is that these sorts of problems don’t have solutions logically deducible from the NAP; rather, like continuum problems, they only really have “common law” solutions. However, you seem to think that their solution is indeed logically deducible, which I found rather odd, and possibly dangerous since it can lead to confusion about the scope of the NAP.
(Example: A poster (Jenny I believe) in the above comment thread who deduces from these examples that there is a “right to use your house”, seeming to include bashing your way through someone else’s property to get to it.)
To see this point, consider a future where helicopter technology is cheap and efficient. In such a future I can’t see landlocking as being considered a rights violation at all. (Note: Not merely a small or tiny violation, but a non-violation.) But now, merely because helicopters are expensive, the NAP seems to somehow imply landlocking violates rights.
However, you maintain that “my defense of my rights must not inflict harm on others disproportionate to the seriousness of the rights’ infringement”
For this to work, the landlocker’s efforts to defend his concrete barrier/hotel chain/whatever must exceed in severity my violation of his barrier/hotel/whatever. Yet if he were to enter my home by tearing down one of my walls I could order him off at gunpoint, and you wouldn’t consider this to be a “disproportionate” response, correct? If my response defending my house is acceptable, then logically his response defending his hotel/barrier should be acceptable too.
The underlying lesson I think should be drawn is that not everything in libertarianism can be logically deduced from the NAP, or even the modified NAP I defended earlier. I’m not saying I agree with utilitarians like Friedman on these issues, but nevertheless quasibill is correct in that there are some important aspects to a general law code which, if they are decided the “right” way, will not merely take the NAP into account, but local traditions and common sense as well.
Administrator said,
October 18, 2006 at 8:23 pm
Then I’m not sure what we’re disagreeing about, beyond perhaps terminology and details of application. My position is, and for the last decade or so has been, that the content of NAP, i.e. the content of what counts as “aggression,” is partly specified by “local traditions and common sense.”
Rad Geek said,
October 18, 2006 at 8:58 pm
Anyonmous2: For this to work, the landlocker’s efforts to defend his concrete barrier/hotel chain/whatever must exceed in severity my violation of his barrier/hotel/whatever. Yet if he were to enter my home by tearing down one of my walls I could order him off at gunpoint, and you wouldn’t consider this to be a “disproportionate” response, correct? If my response defending my house is acceptable, then logically his response defending his hotel/barrier should be acceptable too.
I’m not sure that proportionality is actually the best general solution to right-of-way / landlocking problems (since it seems to me that that leaves the enforcement of right-of-way as an injustice against the landlocker–just an injustice that she cannot justifiably retaliate against). But I don’t think your argument here actually cuts any ice against Roderick’s position. The way that Roderick spells out the principle of proportionality has to do with the “moral seriousness” of the force being used, which is not merely a function of the intensity or “severity” of the physical force being employed on each side. (That’s a very important factor, but it’s only one factor among many.)
So there may be cases where Jones’s use of force is disproportionate but Smith’s use of force, even though the same degree and kind of physical force is being employed on both sides of the conflict. This can happen whenever there is some contextual factor that makes Jones’s use of force more “morally serious” than Smith’s.
Like the difference between (1) shooting someone who is only trying to gain right of way off her landlocked property in order to buy groceries, as vs. (2) shooting someone who is holding your property in a state of siege and has now started tearing down your walls for no apparent purpose other than invading your home. Just to take an example.
Anonymous2 said,
October 18, 2006 at 9:36 pm
The way that Roderick spells out the principle of proportionality has to do with the “moral seriousness” of the force being used
I’m not really sure I see the distinction between “severity” and “(moral) seriousness” - since we’re talking about a certain moral theory, namely libertarian justice, aren’t they the same thing?
Just to take an example…
I don’t think the purpose of the invasion is relevant to determining whether or not something is an invasion. However, if you want, we could change the scenario so that both the landlocker and the landlocked are blocking each other from a vital resource - maybe person A fenced in some prime grazing land to which person B (the landlocker) requires for his cattle. So then person A must violate person B’s property to use the grocery store, and person B must violate person A’s property to graze his cattle. I don’t think it matters either way - the point is that we cannot just wish away uncomfortable “hard cases” by claiming their solution follows logically from the NAP; either we must restate the NAP to avoid them (as Dr. Long claims he has done with “proportionality”) or else acknowledge that their resolution is essentially arbitrary, i.e. determined by whatever the common law dictates.
Albert Esplugas said,
October 19, 2006 at 5:12 am
Rad Geek: But clearly it does not permit the peaceful realization of any and every end. (…)But since “non-aggressive” is just a synonym here for “non-rights-violating,” that is equivalent to saying “Rights … permit the peaceful realization of all the ends that don’t violate rights.” That’s certainly true (analytically true, even), but I don’t see how it proves anything at all about the status of respecting rights vis-a-vis other moral commitments.
I disagree with your characterization of that position. My definition is not tautological. I’m not defining rights using the concept of rights. I say: Libertarianism is the only system that permit every individual to pursue his ends peacefully / avoiding conflict. Peace / the avoiding of conflict is not the same as rights, but it implies (libertarian) rights by reasoning. In other words, given the nature of both human beigns and the world in wich they live, if individuals have to pursue their ends avoiding conflict they need rights, and not any kind of rights, they need rights consistent with the NAP. Also, I’m not deriving any ought from an is. I’m only saying that if someone wants to be civilized (and, a la Hoppe, by the very same act of arguing this issue at least he is acting in a civilized manner / trying to avoid conflict), if someone wants to live with others peacefully and pursue his ends undisturbed, he has to arrive at libertarian conclusions. If someone has agressive values and doesn’t want to be civilized / avoid conflict, I don’t see why I have to care at all about what he thinks. He doesn’t expect any reciprocity by his own act, he is renouncing to be treated in a civilized manner. If he attacks me, I will use force to repeal him. Period.
But I don’t want slimy male supremacist types (or racist creeps, or blowhard know-it-all bosses, or whatever) to feel welcomed in a libertarian order. I think they are at best obnoxious deadweight and at worst an active menace to the prospects for liberty.
But only the second is relevant if we are talking about libertarianism and not your personal values. If they are non-agressive / peaceful people, why not welcome them in a libertarian order? Because you consider them morally obnoxious? This is not a libertarian reason, and it’s the point I attempt to make all along in this discussion.
Besides, consider what I have said in the previous comment: “if you as a libertarian promote not only the NAP but also other kind of values, other libertarians with different values will be tempted to promote, qua libertarians, his own values, and the distintion between rights and value will be blurred.” Other libertarians could argue that immigrants, for example, pose a risk to a libertarian order (immigrants from a different culture, or immigrants that come from a statist region to an ancap place). And they could encorauge other people the expel them from their properties / communities. Or other libertarians could say that homosexuality undermines family, and families are a necessary fortress between individuals and the state, so qua libertarians we have to fight against homosexuality etc. I think all this focus on “oppressive values” (again, qua libertarians) can undermine the very own cause you favor, and confuse libertarians about the true objective of libertarianism: a non-agressive society. I think that, in a way, all fight against what you call oppressive values at the most should be instrumental to the achievement, application or justification of the NAP, and this has to be made clearly explicit every time. (I think this post fails in this respect, which is the reason I have stepped in). Qua libertarians we are not against these values per se, but (at the most) because they can undermine libertarianism / the NAP in one way or another.
By the way, I heartily agree with the thesis of this Block’s paper: http://blog.mises.org/archives/005264.asp
I’m an anarchist, so I do not advocate using force against anyone — even real creeps — who conscientiously abstains from initiating force against others. But there’s no reason why I should have to co-operate with, or evangelize to, or cater to the sensitivies of, or moderate my tone towards, people whose values I find not only morally repugnant, but also specifically a menace to the real-world application or implementation of libertarian principles. I don’t want to be part of a movement that they are part of and I don’t want to live in a community where they feel welcome. (Besides which I think that any movement in which they are happily accepted is unlikely to make any concrete, long-term progress towards freedom.)
It sounds reasonable to me.
If I’m understanding you rightly, it might help if you could explain more specifically you think that alienating (say) nonviolent white supremacists or peaceful patriarchs is harmful to libertarian prospects.
I have assumed that alienating peaceful people is harmful to libertarianism because it can reduce the number of its adherents or raise opposition to it (and that, I have assumed, is a bad thing). On the contrary, a big tent libertarianism won’t be seen as a menace by nonviolent individuals, and of course it doesn’t preclude that we fight, as moral agents, against their “oppressive” values.
But “I will not tolerate white supremacy, even where nonviolently imposed, and I will actively organize and agitate against it” is a very different claim from “I am going to start shooting people involved in imposing white supremacy, even if they do so nonviolently” are two obviously different claims, which can be clearly distinguished. And if I make the distinction clearly (which, as a libertarian, I take pains to do), then I don’t see how it would my fault if other people then blurred the distinction that I made.
Ok, I agree. But what concerns me is only that: are you defending both proposition qua libertarian? Or the first position can be defended simply as a moral agent / not qua libertarian? If you say that you defend the first proposition qua libertarian (at least without making explicit that this defense is instrumental to the NAP), I have troubles with that. This is my point.
Roderick Long:
Well, I think we don’t agree in the issue of morality / foundation of ethics, but I will study it more carefully.
This objection seems to cut at least as much for me as against me, though. For there are plenty of people who have an aversion to libertarianism because they think it’s indifferent to nonviolent oppression.
But they are mistaken because libertarianism does not mandate a specific set of values, but permit individuals to promote / campaing against values that they consider morally wrong. A lot of people think that libertarians are morally neutral or amoral persons, we are not of course. We oppose only agrressive actions qua libertarians, but like the rest of human beings we also have our preferences and values, and like those people that oppose “oppression” we (or nearly all of us) also oppose “oppression” in our every day life. The fact others don’t interpret all that in this way I think is a reason to explain it to them, not a reason to include the fight against “oppression” in the libertarian realm.
Because of the three kinds of thickness. Strategic thickness: I claim that a racist society is unlikely to stay libertarian, since it lacks the kind of respect for personhood that a libertarian society depends upon. (Thus as Anonymous2 predicts, I’m skeptical of your “no risk that it will disappear” claim.) Application thickness: I claim that a society that’s confused about respectful treatment in that way is likely to make more mistakes in the application of libertarianism even if they don’t abandon the principle. Grounds thickness: even if they don’t abandon the principle and don’t misapply it, I think their position is unreasonable because there’s a conflict between their racism and the best reasons for being a libertarian, so that even if their racism doesn’t actually undermine their libertarianism, it logically ought to.
ok, it makes sense. Let me add what I have said to Rad Geek: I think that, in a way, all fight against what you call oppressive values at the most should be instrumental to the achievement, application or justification of the NAP, and this has to be made clearly explicit every time. (I think this post fails in this respect, which is the reason I have stepped in). Qua libertarians we are not against these peaceful values per se, but (at the most) because they can undermine libertarianism / the NAP in one way or another.
quasibill said,
October 19, 2006 at 12:51 pm
Roderick,
I’m just too wary of culture, and the multitude of ways that cultures can non-aggressively conflict to the point of creating a call for aggressive responses. “Racism” is quite often more appropriately called “culturalism”, and the difference between the two is actually quite important. Further, I fear that some fundamental cultural pillars, while leading to some oppressive cultural applications, are also the pillars to liberty in those cultures - so weakening the consistent application of the pillar is a blow against broader liberty.
As an example of my first concern, I’ll point to a controversy local to me. A certain immigrant population has over the last 20 years become more and more numerous in my area. One overbroad generalization I can make about their culture is that they tend to like to put nice, big, cushy sofas on their front lawns. It’s a social phenomenon, and, I believe, in their culture, a very pro-liberty phenomenon. It creates a social space where everyone in the community has some idea about everyone else. This community awareness is great from issues such as charity, to ‘policing’, all the way to protecting children from abuse. Someone merely not being present on their lawn for a few nights causes concern among the community.
Now, some of the locals don’t like the result, for a multitude of reasons. Obviously, some of the couches get left out through any weather, and degrade somewhat quickly, and become eyesores. Also, there’s an argument that they attract vermin after time. Finally, there’s just simply little cultural understanding, and therefore some fear of, these people “hanging out” all the time - many people outside the culture (perhaps rightfully so) get the feeling best described by the Animal House scene in the bar.
Now, this second group might get together in a neighborhood and provide contractually that the properties are restricted from having the couches on the yard. The problem comes from enforcement costs, (even if the legal system has the equivalent of covenants running with the land). As a result, these people might conclude that their best bet in maintaining the lifestyle and culture that they prefer is to discriminate against those in the immigrant culture. Taking this option out of their bag, and making them social pariahs for using it, will merely subvert their still existing desire to be free of the couches into a call for aggressive regulation of everyone’s property. This is, in reality, much of the basis for support of zoning laws currently (and in fact, this fight was played out in the zoning boards).
As for the second concern, I point to the Amish. I personally think their “failure to forgive is the worst sin” credo leads to some perverse, oppressive results. However, it is their scrupulously consistent adherence to such principles that makes their society such a stable, free community in the middle of perhaps the most intrusive empire ever known. Knock out the applications that I disagree with, and perhaps the whole community loses its admirable qualities too, as you have now allowed exceptions to the fundamental principles (we can see what that has done to the Constitution).
I think as libertarians, and especially of the anarcho-variety, we must be very respectful of the power of culture, and the historical forces that created it, and of the fact that many people’s identity is closely tied to, if not in fact entirely based upon, their culture. I think as long as the NAP is respected, the strongest action that should be taken against oppressive cultural issues (as opposed to cultural outliers in a given community) is argument (i.e., no boycott, etc.), and even that must be done very carefully and respectfully.
Anonymous2 said,
October 19, 2006 at 3:24 pm
I think as long as the NAP is respected, the strongest action that should be taken against oppressive cultural issues (as opposed to cultural outliers in a given community) is argument (i.e., no boycott, etc.), and even that must be done very carefully and respectfully.
That’s an interesting response, because in the sofa example it’s the immigrants putting the rotting sofas on their lawns that I would regard as the “oppressors”, and boycott (i.e. “discrimination”) would be a perfectly reasonable response to it. No society of free individuals is going to succeed if people are looked down upon for organizing boycotts of evil or disruptive individuals, especially the ones who do things that are really bad yet don’t violate rights (as happens in this case).
quasibill said,
October 20, 2006 at 7:37 am
“That’s an interesting response, because in the sofa example it’s the immigrants putting the rotting sofas on their lawns that I would regard as the “oppressors”, and boycott (i.e. “discrimination”) would be a perfectly reasonable response to it.”
That’s exactly my point, although I’m going to say that the immigrants will equally see themselves as the victims in the scenario. So the key is to allow each culture to segregate itself - if, and to the extent that it so desires - and practice a form of racism. As time passed, some more repulsive manifestations of the cultural preference may manifest (i.e., refusing to serve any immigrant in the local store), but then you have the same point I made about the Amish.
“No society of free individuals is going to succeed if people are looked down upon for organizing boycotts of evil or disruptive individuals”
Well, to me, evil only gets applied to those who violate the NAP. And disruptive is almost always a matter of cultural mores, so it’s going to be a highly subjective value judgment, there. The sofas aren’t disruptive in the immigrant culture, but they are to the pre-existing culture in the area. Who’s disrupting who? The immigrants say the nosy, pushy locals are, while the locals say the immigrants are.
As I said, I feel the better option, rather than in your face boycotting, etc., is merely to move away and create your own cultural haven. And surely, the large cosmopolitan cities will remain largely multi-cultural, although you probably will have Little Italys and Little Chinas, etc. even there.
quasibill said,
October 20, 2006 at 7:44 am
Oh, and let me say this about the sofas - I think as time goes by, the culture and economy will evolve to the point where having “nice” sofas (by some subjective criteria - lord knows I don’t agree with their taste in decorating their cars
, but that is a subjective call ) is a part of the culture. The people won’t want to be seen as having eyesore couches. This part of the phenomenon will pass, if allowed to run its natural course.
However, trying to force the change will only cause resistance, especially if the economics of teh community can’t currently support it. And that resistance then manifests itself in all sorts of cultural “defects” that lead to more conflicts.
Jeremy said,
October 20, 2006 at 11:11 am
Is it too reductionist to say that they wouldn’t feel comfortable because they have to assume the costs of their beliefs - psychological, social, economic? I am, of course, assuming and arguing that non-egalitarian approaches “cost” more: discrimination turns away otherwise good customers and business associates; bigotry requires one to maintain a level of psychological aggression that is draining; etc.
What I mean is that until we get rid of the coercive mechanism by which these costs are offset onto society instead of completely internalized, doesn’t it make more strategic sense to concentrate on the coercion? If we really believe in “thick libertarianism”, does it really require any defense at all, or is it the natural result of libetarianism, upon which we can safely count once we remove the State?
We must be careful to distinguish likely outcomes of our politics from the motivating core of our politics. I don’t see any harm in agitating for social justice and egalitarianism - I do it all the time - but I simply make clear that these are secondary implications of the primary goal: abolition of institutionalized coercion.
Julius Blumfeld said,
October 25, 2006 at 10:17 am
Course it could be that Rothbard was just wrong on this. Entertaining, but wrong.
Julius Blumfeld said,
October 25, 2006 at 10:18 am
“Perhaps landlocking someone would violate his rights because the perpetrator has imposed a death sentence on someone who has not himself violated rights.”
Since this doesn’t happen in the real world, I don’t see that it poses much of a challenge to libertarian theory!
Anonymous2 said,
October 25, 2006 at 9:21 pm
True Blumfeld, but one doesn’t always debate something in philosophy because it’s likely to happen.
Upon reflection, I dicovered a good title for my rant would be “Was Monstressor a libertarian?”. I’m surprised nobody used a phrase like “Amontillado-libertarian” in the responses; it’s catchy, no?
Bill Wasserman said,
January 13, 2007 at 7:14 pm
Google is the best search engine
John Newell said,
March 10, 2007 at 11:14 pm
Please distribute to all those who would be interested
Oppose Oppression with Ten Billion Pricks
Organised opposition to an oppressor requires leaders, who will
then be eliminated. But the oppressor can still be opposed by the
the oppressed if every one were to attack the oppressor with a
series of little pin pricks. Some possible examples are as follows:
1) Never show intelligence or initiative when working for the
oppressor
2) Only understand the simplest instructions
3) Commit many acts of minor or symbolic destruction
4) Be inefficient
5) Leak secrets slowly
6) act on behalf of the individual, not the oppressor
7) Act a bit strangely
8) Arrange objects in a patterns that are understood to be
agaist the oppressor
9) When walking in squares or street intersections,
walk in a counterclockwise direction to show opposition
10) Avoid streets with names associated with the oppressor
11) Do not join any judicial or security organisation unless to
oppose the oppressor
12) When appropriate, members of security forces shall make
their superiors less effective at oppression unless these
superiors have made their own superiors less effective
13) vote and attend meetings as late as possible
14) Work to rule
15) In the street, gather in bunches, walk in bunches, walk in
lock step
16) Everyone is to get into minor trouble
17) Disable surveillance equipment
18) Laugh at the oppressor
19) Invent, invent, think, adapt, reject, add
20) Do what other people do so that all do the same thing
to show opposition to the oppressor
21 Have Fun
Against politics « Entitled to an Opinion said,
September 21, 2007 at 3:40 pm
[…] If Paul did win, here is what I expect would happen: he would veto every bill that he believed was unconstitutional, just as he votes against them now. That would be just about every bill Congress passes. Congress would in many cases overturn his vetoes, but it would minimize the flow of legislation. As an anti-federalist, I would prefer if the national government did not exist at all. In general my assumption is that any action taken by that government is idiotic and harmful. I do not see the political arena as one through which the good is advanced, but rather as something like the human sacrifices performed by the Aztecs because they believed it was necessary to cause the sun to rise (Mike Huemer has a good explanation of why politics and religion are so irrational here, but I dispute his contention that morality is objective and can be known). I disagree with the main message in this from Roderick Long (that libertarians ought to be concerned with “oppression” other than coercion), but I agree with his characterization of libertarians as largely wanting politics not to exist. A possibly useful sort of legislation is that which overturns previous legislation and ends those idiotic and harmful activities undertaken, but there is far less of that than the other kind. Congress is unlikely to do much of that under Paul, but he himself could undo a great many executive orders and possibly put some restraints on the permanent bureaucracy that could be thought of as a fourth branch of government if it were not technically under the executive. […]