Love, Marriage, and Divorce (1853/1889)

by Henry James, Sr. (1811-1882), Horace Greeley (1811-1872)
and Stephen Pearl Andrews (1812-1886)




LMD-11.1 Mr. H. James condescends to reply, obliquely still, to my structures upon his crude social theories. The condescension is amiable, but the imprudence is unpardonable. It was obviously one of those cases in which discretion is the better part of valor. He does not appreciate my disposition “not to be cruel.” Such ingratitude provokes a severity which he can ill afford to draw upon himself. I am surprised – I may even say grieved – that he compels me to a still further exposure of the unhandsome features of his course of reasoning upon the subject in debate. With an apology to the reader for a thoroughness of criticism, bordering on harshness, forced on me by the indiscretion of “Your Correspondent,” I will proceed, as cautiously as I can, and, even, notwithstanding all, with dome remaining touches of tenderness, to the dissection of “Your Correspondent’s” last article.
LMD-11.2 The following is the gist of his effort to restate himself:

“You feel that all man’s relations to his fellows, and especially to woman, should be baptized from above, or acknowledge an ideal sanction before all things, and that where this sanction is absent, consequently, the relation is either strictly infantile or else inhuman. In respect to this higher sanction and bond of conjugal fidelity, you call the legal bond inferior or base. As serving and promoting the former, one deems the latter excellent and honorable; but as ceasing any longer to do so, you deem it low and bestial.”
LMD-11.3 Now, the deliberate purpose of your Correspondent here is to show that he is not, and could not have been, adverse to the institution of marriage, because, forsooth, as he has “all along contended,” there are circumstances in which that institution is of value to society – namely, in its infancy – and to impress upon the incautious reader the idea that I am laboring under a woeful degree of mental confusion in attributing to him the doctrine that marriage (the legal bond) should be “incontinently abolished.”
LMD-11.4 Very good, so far; but it so happens that your Correspondent has very recently devoted large space, in more than one of his communications to the Tribune, to proving that Society among us is no longer in that state of infancy in which the outward marriage bind is “subservient and ministerial to the higher spiritual sanction,” but that it has now arrived, on the contrary, at that precise stage of advancement and full growth in which the legal bond is “inferior and base,” or “inhuman,” or “low and bestial,” or “purely diabolical,” and ought, therefore, to be dispensed with or wholly abolished.
LMD-11.5 Let us betake ourselves again to quotation. Discussing this very subject, and having shown that the legal bond was a necessity of the infant state of human society, your Correspondent proceeded to say: “But now that [Society] has overleaped that period of infantile fragility, and feels the motions of ripe and sinewy manhood, the questions of order and harmony can be no longer postponed. It is bound by a feeling of self-respect to become decorous and orderly, and to put away [Online editor’s note: 1 Corinthians 13:11 – RTL], consequently, all those arbitrary methods of action which were dictated by mere expediency or self-preservation.” Hence, your Correspondent distinctly makes the changes in legislation requisite to adapt it to the present ripeness of human society, to stand in “fully legitimating divorce,” or in discharging our conjugal relations of the “purely diabolic element of outward force” – in other words, the virtual abolition of legal and forceful marriage, as “ceasing any longer to serve and promote the higher sanction and bond of fidelity” – having, “for his own part,” as he says, “not the slightest doubt that, in that case, constancy would speedily avouch itself the law of the conjugal relation, instead of, as now, the rare exception.”
LMD-11.6 Now, your Correspondent has repeatedly brought forward and urged, as you well know, and as the public well knows, this precise remedy for the existing disconsonance of Society and its legislation, as a practical cure for a practical evil. Now, then, he says, with an exclamation point for surprise, that I betray so crude an apprehension of the discussion, that I confound his “denunciation of base and unworthy motives in marriage with a denunciation of marriage itself!” What charming simplicity! what delightful innocence! A practical, straightforward, political, or legislative measure, of the most radical and revolutionary kind, proposed and repeatedly urged as the remedy for wide-spread actual suffering and disorder in the community, suddenly retires into the dimensions of a ghostly remonstrance, from a kind-hearted spiritual adviser, against bad motives in matrimony! Ah, Mr. Henry James, when hard pressed by a logic that won’t bend to “Individual Sovereignty,” an “artful dodge” may be highly creditable to one’s agility, but hardly to the higher attributes of a manly nature. Were it not for the cunning evinced in the maneuver, the want of courage and the seeming simplicity might be suggestive of “sheep’s head” without “the pluck.” As it is, we are reminded, also, of a different animal. For myself, I once had a good practice in Virginia fox-hunting, an training after these doublings has to me the interest of reviving old reminiscences: to the reader who finds no such amusement in the chase, and who looks merely for candor, truth-seeking, and consistency, in a discussion, I fear they may be simply disgusting.
LMD-11.7 If, in the case adduced for illustration, the “Spiritual Adviser” had gone a step farther, and expressly advocated the theory that “all arbitrary methods of action,” in the premises, should be “put away,” that nobody should be compelled, by “outward force,” to restore property which he had found and that, by such freedom from the “legal bond,” the notion of the right of property would be “ennobled,” and the man and all men led to act, from their own “humanity and inward sweetness,” honorably and honestly in such cases; and if I, upon reading such a statement of views, should have said, perchance, that that is precisely my theory for the abolition of all laws for the collection of debts and the like – saving the question, to be settled afterward, what are legitimate debts bearing upon the conscience – and if Mr. Spiritual Adviser, shrinking from the more open and bolder presentation of his own theory, and determined to be respectable at all hazards, should, thereupon, accuse me of confusion of ideas, superficiality, etc., your Correspondent wants to know what I should say; and I reply that I should say, that this “Spiritual Adviser,” intent upon saving his own skin, did nor hesitate to slander and malign his neighbor, and to obfuscate his readers by a resort to trickery, and ad captandum pleadings [Online editor’s note: ad captandum vulgus, “to win over the crowd” – RTL] unworthy of a man of some reputation and literary pretensions.
LMD-11.8 So much for Dodge No. 1. Before proceeding with the catalogue, permit me to furnish a gloss to the reader, to inform him of what I suppose the real position of your Correspondent to be. I do this to remove the impression, to which I feel myself liable, after the showing I have made, of engaging with a combatant whose statements of doctrine are too contradictory and absurd to aspire to the dignity of criticism. Notwithstanding appearances, I do not think so. There is, I am satisfied, a consecutive train of idea running through the whole of his reasonings upon the subject, which, if it can be cleared of a certain confusedness in the use of terms by which he is constantly prone to obscure, rather than illustrate, his thought, will be found quite as consistent as the notions of many other loose thinkers, who aspire to instruct the public upon philosophical subjects, and who gain considerable estimation for the want of just criticism.
LMD-11.9 What your Correspondent means to say, then, rendered into a comprehensible plainness of speech and tolerable brevity, is just this. Marriage is the union of one man and one woman for life. But there are two phases or aspects of marriage, or, in fine, two marriages, or kinds of marriage. 1. The outward or legal, that of which the perpetuity and exclusiveness depend upon human laws and are enforced by the Courts, which I will call Legal Marriage; and, 2. That which he calls “the ideal sanction of the conjugal relation,” and which I will call, for the sake of a convenient term, Spiritual Marriage. This last, he believes, tends to exhibit itself in the lives of all rightly developed men and women, in just the same form of perpetuity and exclusiveness which legal marriage now attempts to enforce by virtue of pains and penalties; that we have now arrived at that stage of development at which this tendency to the spiritual tie declares itself so strongly (or exists undeclared) that the continuance of the old legal bond, which was good enough in its day, instead of securing the action toward which it and the “higher sanction” both tend, operates as an irritant and a disturber, and hinders or prevents the very end at which it aims; that, consequently, sound morals and good policy both demand, as the remedy, that “Divorce be Freely Legitimated,” or, what is the same thing, legal marriage abolished; not that he is opposed to marriage, that is, to the same course of life which legal marriage enacts in the form of law, but because this last is not merely unnecessary but hurtful in securing that end.
LMD-11.10 This theory, so stated, comes pretty much to what is entertained in this age, more or less distinctly, by a good many persons transcendentally inclined, and whose views of prospective human improvement take no broader and no more practical shape than that of spiritualizing whatsoever thing, however stupid, which happens now to exist among us. Finding an existing relation so oppressive, that neither they nor their fathers were able to bear the actual yoke, they fancy that exactly the same thing spiritualized, must be exactly the right thing. Still the theory, such as it is, is quite intelligible when not “bedeviled” by unnecessary fog and pretensious mysticism.
LMD-11.11 It is true that you Correspondent has no right to claim any such sensible rendering of his views. He has pertinaciously insisted upon saying that “the legal bond” is the whole of marriage, that the spiritual tie is not marriage at all, and that the legal bond ought now to be dispensed with. I should, therefore, have been perfectly justified, upon ordinary views of criticism, if I had taken him for what he has repeatedly declared himself to be, in words, and stated purely and simply that he denounces the institution of marriage entirely. I have nevertheless kindly, as I thought, abstained from taking advantage of this verbal confusion, and inasmuch as he refers to “the higher sanction of the conjugal tie,” and uses other similar phrases, although denying that they signify marriage in any sense, I have confined myself to speaking of him as opposed to Legal Marriage. To talk of the law as sanctioning what will exist just as well without it, and what is not to continue to exist by virtue of it, is nonsense. The mere ceremony, having no binding effect, is nothing to which you or your Correspondent, or I, or any body, would attach the slightest importance.
LMD-11.12 As I happen to think, myself, that forcing two people who hate each other, to liev together in the most intimate relation, and become monks or beget children of their hatred, is neither very philosophical nor religious, I was quite disposed to “fraternize” with your Correspondent up to that point. This, alas! was the head and front of my offending. [Online editor’s note: Othello, I.3.90 – RTL] It was not that I differed from, but that I agreed with him, and out in a little clearer and stronger light the points of our agreement, that he was horrified and alarmed, and recoiled.
LMD-11.13 Our points of difference lie here. He, “for his part,” has no doubt that “constancy would speedily avouch itself as the law of the conjugal relation, in the absence of all legislation to enforce it.” I, for my part, don’t know that. We have never yet witnessed a state of society consisting of educated, refined, and well-developed persons, in which Freedom of the Affections, for both men and women, was tolerated and approved. I am unable to dogmatize with reference to the precise nature of the relations which would come to prevail under such a régime. I know simply that it is the right thing, and that its results must therefore be good, however much they may differ from my preconceived notions of propriety. I decline to make myself the standard: I recognize the equal sovereignty of all other men, and of all women. I do not and can not know the nature of any other man or woman, so as to be competent to decide for them. I doubt not, I shall do my duty if I obey the highest thing which I find in my own being. I claim the right to do that. I allow the same right to all others. It is a species of spiritual arrogance for me to assume to decide for them, which I voluntarily lay down and totally abjure.
LMD-11.14 Mr. James claims Freedom because, for his part, he believes that Freedom will lead people to act just in that way which he personally thinks to be right. I, on the contrary, claim Freedom for all Men and all Women, for no such personal reason, but because they have an inalienable God-given right, high as Heaven above all human legislation, to judge for themselves what is moral, and proper, and right for them to do or abstain from doing; so long as they do not cast the burdens of their conduct on me. I plant myself on that Principle, and challenge the attention of mankind to it as the Law of Order, and Harmony, and Elevation, and Purity among men. Herein we do radically differ. I take the position which, saving the judgment of my critics, is exceedingly new in the world, that I have no better right to determine what it is moral or proper for you TO DO,* than I have to determine what it is religious for you TO BELIEVE; and that, consequently, for me to aid in sending you or another man to prison for Fornication, or Bigamy, or Polygamy, or a woman for wearing male attire, and the like, is just as gross an outrage in kind, upon Human Rights, as it would be to aid in burning you at Smithfield [Online editor’s note: area of London used in mediæval times for executions – RTL] for Protestantism or Papacy, or at Geneva for discarding the doctrine of the Trinity.
LMD-11.15 But to return to your Correspondent. He bases his defense of Freedom upon his personal judgment of the form it will give to the sexual relations. To test the depth and sincerity of his convictions, I ask him a question. I assume that we differ as regards what is the truest state of the relations of the sexes, and call his attention to the fact that people do differ, upon all subjects, in virtue of their infinite Individualities. I suppose the case that in the use of our new-fledged freedom, I act on my convictions, not his, and change my relations every week or month, or take an unusual number of conjugal partners, or in some way depart from his ideal. I ask, in very good faith, and as a practical thing, since this freedom is to be a matter of practical legislation, whether he proposes, or not, still to retain a Police Office to compel me to use Freedom! according to his idea of the way in which it should be used – if not his, whether according to anybody’s standard, other than that of the Individual himself. Hereupon he assumes the air of a dignified aristocratic “indifference,” and regards my question as trivial, disingenuous, and impertinent. Of course the judicious reader will perceive at once that it strikes home to the very vitals of his whole system of Legislative Reform, and drives him back to a sphere to which it is to be hoped he may find his abilities better adapted, that of Spiritual Adviser to bad husbands, and a general lecturer of fanatics on the amendment of their “disorderly methods of living.”
LMD-11.16 The next point of your Correspondent is either Dodge No. 2 or a gross blunder. The reader shall judge which. It is a perversion of my doctrine of the Sovereignty of the Individual, and it seems to me a deliberate perversion, by your Correspondent, in order to have before him a man of straw, that he could knock down. Our formula is, “The Sovereignty of every Individual, to be exercised at his own cost.” This simply and obviously means, “to be exercised, not at the cost of other people,” or, as we have constantly and repeatedly explained it, “To be so exercised as not to throw the burdensome consequences of one’s actions upon others,” precisely as religious freedom is and has been for years understood among us. A man may believe what he pleases, and do, in the way of worship, whatsoever wise or foolish thing, provided he assails nobody else’s Liberty, or Life, or Property.
LMD-11.17 This simple doctrine, the mere extension to morals and other spheres of a principle already adopted, and to the partial operation of which the world owes treasures of harmony and happiness, your sagacious and veracious Correspondent has converted into the assertion of the right to commit every species of encroachment and outrage that savages or devils could aspire to, provided one is only ready to take the consequences. This atrocious doctrine he has, by the use of false quotation marks, thrust into my mouth! Of course, attributing such nonsense and profligacy to me, he has the field to himself, to make the most glaring exhibition of his own absurdity. I hope he enjoyed the pyrotechnic display of his own witticisms, as some compensation for the wear and tear of conscience involved in such a gross misrepresentation of an opponent’s position, if it were really intentional; if it were a blunder merely, and he has honestly stated the principle, “as well as he can master its contents,” I hardly know whether to recommend to him so much exertion as to try again. There is certainly little wisdom in attempting to pass off a mere condensed expression of foolishness and diabolism, as if it were the substance of an axiom which challenges the admiration of mankind, as the most exact and the most scientific solution ever to be attained of the great problem of the legitimate limit of Human Freedom.
LMD-11.18 I quite regret that your Correspondent should be oppressed by my patronage, but I really can’t help it. I must be permitted to admire what there is good and true in every man’s utterances. I find much of that sort in what he has given to the world, and I admire it. I even wish that I found more of it, and more especially of that intellectual and moral hardihood which would perceive the extension by implication of the truth he does utter, and stand by the defense of it with a little generous devotion and occasional forgetfulness of purely personal considerations.
LMD-11.19 A word now as respects my “small insolences.” I assure your Correspondent they are merely “put on” upon the principle similia similibus [Online editor’s note: similia similibus curantur, “like is cured by like,” or similia similibus curentur, “let like be cured by like”; homeopathic slogans – RTL], and small doses, to cure his big ones. I shall gladly lay them aside whenever good manners begin to prevail. I think I shall be found competent to the interchange of gentlemanly courtesies when gentlemanly courtesies are in demand. Indeed, I decidedly prefer the atmosphere of the parlor to that of the “ring,” but I endeavor, at the same time, to adapt myself to the nature of circumstances and of men.
LMD-11.20 Your Correspondent presumes that, when he says Freedom is one with Order, I should greatly like him to add, “And Order is one with License.” When License is used for something different from Freedom, I suppose it signifies the bad use of Freedom. Now, it is simply Freedom that I ask for. On what grounds does this Correspondent of yours dare to presume that I desire a bad use to be made of that Freedom, or that I am, in any sense, even his own, a profligate or a bad man; that I contemplate, with complacency, the making of a Hell or a Pandemonium, or that any such result is more likely to come of my freedom, or the freedom that I advocate, than of his freedom, or the freedom he advocates? Whose insolence is it now? Why, Sir, your Correspondent seems to me so bred in the usage of overbearing superciliousness that he ought to be grateful to me for life if I cure him of his habit. This charge of advocating License has always been repeated against the champions of every species of Freedom, political, of the Press, and of every sort whatsoever, and it is time that it should get its rebuke. It has not, however, suppressed other men’s Truth, and it will not suppress mine. Such truth has a vitality in it which survives the blunders of the stupid, the misapprehensions of the feeble-minded, the denunciations of the bigoted, and the alarm and croaking of honest but timorous friends. The brave and the faithful lovers of such Truth have always been, at the inception of its promulgation, a “handful of ridiculous fanatics” in the estimation of the Sophists of their day. It matters not. Truth, no more than the rights of man, can be obliterated by the votes of a majority, the legislation of the State, nor the scorn of the Pharisee; and the viper that tries it always bites a file.
LMD-11.21 In the next place, your Correspondent deems me superficial, because I denominate the State “a mob.” He doesn’t condescend to tell us what it is other than a mob, but proceeds immediately to define Society, as if that were synonymous with the State. I fancy that I have simply analyzed to the bottom what he had taken on trust and in the gross. He admits that “irresponsible governments are entitled to our contempt.” I stand ready to make good the proposition that all governments are, in their every essence, “irresponsible,” just so far as they are governments at all, and that, practically, they have proved so in every experiment ever made by mankind. The whole American theory of “checks and balances” upon parchment, is mere fallaciousness and folly. The only effectual check is that developed Individuality of the People which gives significant notice to government that it won’t answer to go too far, and which, as it becomes more developed, is sure to dispense with government altogether. The advantages which we enjoy in this country, in this respect, come entirely from the greater practical development of the Sovereignty of the Individual; from the greater development of the individual, so that that exercise of Sovereignty can be endured with less evil result; and from the small quantity of government which we tolerate, not at all, as is supposed, from any superiority in the quality of the article. Government will become unnecessary just so soon as the true principles of the Science of Society are understood and practically realized. The realization of those principles will begin in their being discovered and promulgated. Hence, as occasion offers, I preach. I expect, at first, to be partially understood, misunderstood, and misrepresented; but the time of that nebulous perception of the subject will pass. Ideas which are true and fundamental, and as destitute of fluctuation or exception as Mathematics, will make their way and be accepted. Prejudice will give way to Reason, Arbitrary Institutions to Principles, and Antagonism to True Order and Harmony, and the Freedom of a rightly-constituted Human Brotherhood.
LMD-11.22 Your Correspondent says that I exhibit a sovereign contempt for Society. He is certainly mistaken. I am very fond of Society, and especially of good Society. Society is, however, a word of considerable diversity of significations, and is used by your Correspondent in at least three or four different senses, apparently without the slightest consciousness of confounding them.
LMD-11.23 I may as well use this word [Society] as any other to illustrate a certain tendency on the part of your Correspondent, to which I have already adverted, to a lamentable confusion of ideas and terms, in the midst of the most exuberant and sometimes elegant diction. He begins one of his paragraphs by using Society as if it were synonymous with the State, by which I presume he means the Organization and Machinery of Government. In the middle of the same paragraph he defines Society to be “the Sentiment of Fellowship and Equality in the Human Bosom.” In the end of the same paragraph he asserts that the “advance of Society – this Sentiment of Fellowship or Equality – causes man to look away from Governments, and from whatsoever external patronage, and find true help at last in himself;” that is, to resort to the Sovereignty of the Individual. This last is precisely what I believe. For Society, in which of these senses is it that I exhibit a “sovereign contempt?” Whose superficiality is it now?
LMD-11.24 On the very next sentence, your Correspondent adds, “Society is the sole beneficiary of the arts and sciences, and the Individual Man becomes partaker of their benefits only by his identification with it.” In which definition is Society used here? Is it the Government or the State which is the only direct beneficiary of the Arts and Sciences? Is that what it means? Or is it the “Sentiment of Fellowship and Equality among men” which is the direct beneficiary of the Arts and Sciences? Or, finally, is it men individualized by “looking away from Governments and finding true help in themselves,” who are the direct beneficiary, etc., and the Individual man, only because he is “one of ’em?” Whose Superficiality and utter Confusion of ideas is it this time? Words have a tendency to obscurity when no definite ideas are attached to them.
LMD-11.25 Beauties of style, a certain dashing fluency of utterance, brilliancy of fancy, vague intuitions of floating grandeur, or of sublime truth even, simply or conjointly, don’t make a Philosopher. Some clearness of intellectual vision, some analysis and knowledge of causes, some exactness in definition, a certain expansiveness and comprehension of one’s whole subject, and even more than all, perhaps, a rigid adherence to the laws of Dialectics, by which premises are fearlessly pursued to their natural and inevitable conclusions, lead where they may, are requisite to that end. It is always a misfortune to mistake one’s vocation. It is a misfortune, however, which can be partially retrieved at almost any period of life, and we all acquire Wisdom by painful experiences. There is some department, I feel certain, in which your Correspondent might excel. As he declines to be patronized I shall abstain from impertinent suggestions.
LMD-11.26 Dodge No. 3 is another cuttle-fish plunge into the regions of “the infinite,” and, of course, of the indefinite, the accustomed retreat of impracticable theorists. Your Correspondent informs us that as “ideas are infinite they admit of no contrast or oppugnancy.” I think he must have discovered by this time that there is both “contrast” and “oppugnancy” between his ideas and mine, so far at least as his sublimated conceptions still retain any thing of the finite or definite. Into the other region I am willing to follow him when occasion offers, and to examine with the rigorous grasp of modern philosophical criticism, your Corespondent’s fanciful reproduction of Plato’s Idealism and of the rose-colored Atheism of Spinoza, and to separate for him the legitimate from the illegitimate, the possible from the impossible, in the field of human speculation. At the monet, however, my business lies, and his ought to lie, with the simple questions of practical life relating to Marriage and Divorce – the matters under discussion.
LMD-11.27 The doctrine of the Sovereignty of the Individual is an absurdity, contends your Correspondent, because man is under a three-fold subjection, in the nature of things; first, “to Nature, then to Society” (in which meaning of the word?), “and finally to God.” Grant all this be so, does the fact that man must ever remain under a necessary or appropriate subjection to Society, that is, under a certain limitation of the sphere of his activity by the legitimate extension of the spheres of other Individuals – does it follow, I say, that it is an absurdity to inquire and fix scientifically what that limit is. Now, this is precisely what we profess to have done, and we give “the Sovereignty of every Individual to be exercised at his own Cost” as the result of that investigation. What possible application has the vague generalization of your Correspondent, as a counter statement to that principle, how true so ever his proposition may be.
LMD-11.28 It is as if I were to ask the opinion of a Swedenborgian of the policy of abolishing the laws for the collection of debts, and he should reply, “Sir, my opinion is, that if you act rightly in the matter, your action must be dictated by an equal union of the Divine Love and the Divine Wisdom.” I must reply, “Very well, my dear sir, but that is all granted to begin with, and although it may give you a great air of profound wisdom to repeat it, my question is a practical one. I want to know what, in your judgment, would be the operation of Love and Wisdom as applied to the case in everyday practical life which I have brought to your attention.”
LMD-11.29 I ask in all sincerity, “What is the scientific limit of man’s appropriate freedom as respects Society?” and your correspondent replies, with the solemnity of an owl, Sir, it is frivolous and absurd to ask such a question, because there is an appropriate limit upon man’s freedom, and, therefore, man can never be wholly free.
LMD-11.30 And yet your Correspondent has the hardihood to talk of a Scientifically Constituted Society, as if such terms corresponded to any definite ideas in his mind. I want to know whether, in a rightly or scientifically constituted human society, I am to be permitted to read the Protestant Scriptures at Florence; whether I am to be permitted to publish a scientific discovery at Rome; whether I can print my own opinions and views upon general politics at Paris; whether I can travel on a Sunday in Connecticut, etc., etc. I want to know what constitutes an infringement upon the rights of other men, and within what limit I am committing no infringement – not according to the arbitrary legislation of some petty principality, but according to natural and eternal right? To all this, the answer comes back, Nonsense, man is necessarily subject to Society to some extent.
LMD-11.31 Now, Sir, I am fatigued with this sort of infinitude of ideas which have never any “oppugnancy,” because having neither substance nor form, they can produce no shock. I hope your Correspondent will be content to withdraw into that field of pure idealism which is devoid of all “contrasts” and distinctions. It must be laborious to him to inhabit a sphere where definitions and limitations are sometimes necessary to enable us to know what we are talking about. Let him seek his freedom in the broad expanse of the Infinite. I, for the present, will endeavor to vindicate some portion of mine, by ascertaining the exact limits of encroachment between me and my neighbor, religiously refraining from passing those limits myself, and mildly or forcibly restraining him from doing so – as I must.


LMD-11.n1 * With the limitation just stated, of course. That you do not throw burdensome consequences on me.

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