

Chapter 6, on space and motion, pays careful attention to Plato's terminology of place, and evaluates Aristotle's reading of Platonic theory on this topic. Chapter 7 moves on to the *Timaeus's* version of the tri-partition of the soul, beginning with the cosmic soul that provides the basis for the human version, and explaining how the lower parts of the soul are added in the course of the divine teleological operations. The lesser gods "create man as a teleologically ordered system in which the motions that arise by simple necessity and rational motions are combined." This yields "a complex order in which other psychic motions operate alongside those of the intellect in common pursuit of the human good." This yields a human microcosm that agrees well with the cosmic macrocosm, as Johansen explains it, and his picture justifies his intention to rehabilitate the *Timaeus's* human psychology. Chapter 8 tackles the problem of whether sensation plays any serious role—other than as stimulus for thought—in the study of the heavens that is ultimately so important. The answer is a negative, but with the proviso that the role of stimulus is very important. Here I noted the following key sentence: "It is doubtful if *Timaeus* ever treats *doxa* as a psychological faculty." For 'Timaeus' here, might one read 'Plato'?

Chapter 9 asks "Why monologue?" Part of the answer is that only monologue is able to reflect the unity and completeness of the universe that is depicted. A neo-Platonist might add that only monologue reflects the unity of the Demiurge's vision. This answer is also made to explain why the *Critias* is left incomplete. Here I venture one step further. For, in fact, the Athens-Atlantis story is not only incomplete, but also in two separate fragments. Its fragments reflect periodic cycles of commencement and termination that introduce it. Cycles are fundamental to the human experience in the *Republic* and *Timaeus*, and to the universe itself in the *Statesman*. Yet the picture of a single unified creation process offered by *Timaeus* conflicts with a full-scale cosmic cycle of destruction and renewal. The teleology that powers his account cannot accommodate it. Is that account intended to reflect the ideal rather than any imperfect substitute—the unchanging ideal that alone provides the basis for a likeness (whether in matter or in words) that is fine (28a–b)?

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Pamela M. Hood. *Aristotle on the Category of Relation*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2004. Pp. xi + 154. Paper, \$28.00.

It is often assumed that Aristotle cannot have an adequate understanding of relations, and in particular that "his substance-accident ontology and his reduction of propositions to the logical structure of subject-predicate form" (3) compel him to treat relations as monadic properties of the relata. But as Hood shows in this book, Aristotle's theory does indeed make room for dyadic (and generally polyadic) predicates—meaning not just that he employs such predicates in practice (that by itself would be no surprise), but that he does so in self-conscious connection with his theory of relatives. Moreover, Hood argues persuasively that Aristotle's characterization of relatives as holding "somehow" toward their correlatives suggests that he recognizes not only relational properties but relations as well. Along the way, she usefully distinguishes her interpretation from those of other commentators; especially helpful is Hood's diagnosis and critique of Morales's interpretation that relatives cease to be relatives when their correlatives are specified.

At first Hood seems to want to show that Aristotle's account of relations is not only adequate, but also *consistent* with his placing individual substances at the center of his ontology. Given the importance of this ontological orientation to Aristotle's overall philosophic project, it would indeed be valuable to be able to show that Aristotle can acknowledge dyadic relations without sacrificing his ontological commitments. But Hood's remark that Aristotle's relational theory transcends "the limitations of his other philosophical positions" (142) suggests instead that she doubts Aristotle's consistency, and perhaps dismisses his substance-based ontology as well-lost.

Similarly, while Aristotle's claim that the actualization of an agent affecting a patient is something located *in the patient* has sometimes been taken as symptomatic of Aristotle's confused assumption that predicates must have unitary subjects, Hood convincingly refutes this interpretation, showing that Aristotle explicitly describes the actualization as having both the agent and the patient as subjects (62). So far, so good. But one would then expect the moral to be that, when Aristotle speaks of the actualization's being located in the patient, he must mean something *other* than the actualization's having one subject rather than two. Hood concludes instead that Aristotle's "relational theory . . . may outstrip his causal theory" (63), as though the causal claim were embarrassingly indicative of a monadic approach to relatives after all. Left unconsidered is the possibility that Aristotle might have good reasons—unconnected with any confusion about relatives—for locating the actualization in the patient.

Hood's oddest omission is the lack of a clear explanation of what she takes items in the category of relative to *be*: relations? relata? relational properties? Hood glosses Aristotle's observation that "a man is not called 'someone's man' [but rather] 'someone's property'" (*Cat.* 8a22–24) as a distinction "between a specimen from the species and the species itself" (38); but I do not think that that can be right. For if Aristotle's reason for rejecting the expression 'someone's man' were that it would imply that someone owns the human species, then Aristotle's approval of the expression 'someone's property' would correspondingly imply that someone owns the species *property*. Surely what Aristotle actually means is that it is not *qua* man, but rather *qua* property, that a man belongs to someone; the distinction is not between specimen and species, but rather between a subject *qua* specimen of one species and the same subject *qua* specimen of a different species.

Now Hood does see that it is not Peggy's slavehood, but Peggy *qua* slave, that is supposed to be the relative. But it is unclear whether Hood thinks Peggy *qua* slave is just Peggy, or instead some complex (a "kooky object"?) constituted by Peggy together with her slavehood. She calls relatives "Complex Predicative Entities," for example, and writes that, while "Peggy's fundamental existence is as a primary substance, not as a relative," because Peggy is "the underlying subject or ground for the relative," she is accordingly to be counted "as the relative item" (116–17). So is it Peggy who is the relative, albeit not "fundamentally" so? Or is the relative some item of which Peggy merely forms the ground? (My own inclination is rather to doubt that there is any *item* corresponding to the expression 'Peggy *qua* slave' at all; if we take seriously Aristotle's insistence at *Metaphysics* 1003a34–b11 that things in the non-substance categories are not strictly beings, then it might be more accurate to say, not that something called 'Peggy-*qua*-slave' is a relative, but rather that Peggy, the substance, *qua*-slave-is-a-relative; i.e., that while the *qua*-locution in its surface grammar modifies the subject, in its deep grammar, it modifies the predicate.)

Nonetheless, Hood's book represents a valuable contribution, above all for decisively countering the charge that Aristotle could not recognize dyadic predicates. Regrettably, page 22 is missing (in my edition at least), while page 23 is printed twice.

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Philip van der Eijk. *Medicine and Philosophy in Classical Antiquity: Doctors and Philosophers on Nature, Soul, Health and Disease*. Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Pp. xiv + 404. Cloth, \$95.00.

(Full disclosure: Philip van der Eijk was the external examiner for my Ph.D. dissertation.) This immaculately edited volume usefully collects ten significant articles by van der Eijk, together with one chapter (six) based on other previously published material. They appear here slightly revised, bibliographically updated, and with an introduction that provides an excellent guide to current issues and lines of approach in modern scholarship on ancient medicine. The explicit aim of the volume is simply to make these more accessible (1).